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TAKING THE CONFUSION OUT OF “LIKELIHOOD 
OF CONFUSION”: TOWARD A MORE SENSIBLE 
APPROACH TO TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT 
 
Robert G. Bone 
ABSTRACT—This Article critically examines the core infringement 
standard for trademark law—the “likelihood of confusion” test—which 
imposes liability if an appreciable number of consumers are likely to be 
confused by the defendant’s use of its mark. The test is a mess. It produces 
bad results, is doctrinally incoherent, and lacks a sensible normative 
foundation. It chills socially valuable uses and facilitates excessively broad 
expansions of trademark law, and it includes factors that make no sense as 
predictors of likely confusion. Most importantly, the test erroneously 
assumes that consumer confusion is enough to warrant liability without 
regard to the harmful consequences or the moral wrongfulness of the 
defendant’s conduct. This Article diagnoses these problems and proposes a 
set of promising reforms. It begins by presenting a systematic history of the 
test’s origins. The likelihood of confusion test emerged in the early 1960s 
as a compromise between conflicting views about the proper scope of 
protection against noncompeting uses, a compromise that papered over the 
conflict without resolving the underlying normative disagreement. The 
result is a test without a secure normative foundation and one that remains 
plagued by the conflicts and disagreements that gave it birth. The test’s 
history also suggests a promising avenue for reform. To improve the 
infringement standard, one must start at the normative level and work from 
a coherent theory of trademark law’s goals. This Article distinguishes 
between moral and economic goals and fits infringement standards to the 
most plausible justifications for protecting marks. In those cases involving a 
moral wrong, such as intentional deception, moral principles should shape 
the test. In those cases where the economic goals of trademark law are 
paramount, the test should focus not only on the probability of confusion 
but also on the trademark-related harm that confusion generates. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The liability standards for trademark infringement are a mess. For most 
trademark suits, liability turns on the likelihood that an ordinary consumer 
will be confused. The likelihood of consumer confusion, in turn, depends 
on a multifactor test, the application of which varies from circuit to circuit.1 
These multifactor tests are deeply flawed. They support an open-ended and 
relatively subjective approach that generates serious litigation uncertainty, 
chills beneficial uses of marks, and supports socially problematic 
expansions of trademark law. It is time to take a closer look at the 
“likelihood of confusion” test with an eye to replacing it with a more 
sensible approach to trademark infringement. 
In recent years, trademark scholars have identified a number of 
problems with the likelihood of confusion test. In 2006, Professor Barton 
Beebe described it as “in a severe state of disrepair” and complained in 
particular about its inconsistent formulation and application across circuits.2 
More recently, Professor William McGeveran criticized the test’s 
 
1  See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 
94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581, 1591 (2006) (summarizing, in chart form, the factors each circuit considers). 
2  Id. at 1582–84. 
106:1307  (2012) “Likelihood of Confusion” 
 1309
uncertainty and the high litigation costs it generates.3 He argued that 
trademark owners exploit this uncertainty and high cost to chill legitimate 
uses of marks.4 Professor Michael Grynberg points to problematic 
expansions in the types of actionable confusion—from source to 
sponsorship and from point-of-purchase to initial interest and post-sale—
that create product monopolies, impair First Amendment interests, and 
interfere with creative consumer search techniques on the Internet.5 
Professors Mark Lemley and Mark McKenna argue that these problematic 
expansions are linked to the multifactor test’s uncritical focus on likely 
confusion itself, without regard to the materiality of the confusion to 
consumer choice.6 Professor Rebecca Tushnet agrees. She draws on a 
comparison between trademark law and false advertising to argue for the 
addition of a materiality requirement to trademark infringement.7 
These are important criticisms. At a deep level, the likelihood of 
confusion test rests on an inadequately justified and normatively incomplete 
premise. That premise assumes that the ultimate goal of trademark law is to 
prevent consumer confusion. But this makes no sense. People are often 
confused in their ordinary lives and the law does not intervene to help. 
Before a likelihood of confusion can trigger trademark liability, there must 
be a good reason why the law should prevent confusion when it involves 
consumers responding to marks. In short, the likelihood of confusion test 
suffers from a normative gap. It focuses exclusively on the probability of 
confusion when it should also consider confusion-related harm and the 
reasons for redressing that harm. 
Most of the critics who recognize the gap fill it with an economic 
analysis that gives short shrift to moral justifications.8 Moreover, they 
assume that the goal of trademark law is the same as the goal of false 
advertising: to prevent false statements of fact about product quality 
material to consumer choice.9 However, trademark law has a broader 
function: to protect marks as information transmission devices. This 
distinction is important because, as Part IV explains, the information 
transmission function can be impaired in ways that have nothing to do with 
materiality. 
 
3  William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV. 49 (2008). 
4  Id. at 51–52, 66–71. 
5  Michael Grynberg, Trademark Litigation as Consumer Conflict, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 60 (2008); see 
also Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413, 414 (2010) 
(arguing that trademark law should be refocused away from “sponsorship and affiliation confusion . . . 
that do[es] not affect consumers’ decisionmaking process” and back to “confusion that is actually 
relevant to purchasing decisions”). 
6  See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 5, at 414, 427. 
7  Rebecca Tushnet, Running the Gamut from A to B: Federal Trademark and False Advertising 
Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1305, 1365 (2011). 
8  See infra Part IV. 
9  See infra Part IV.B.3. 
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The judicial response is also inadequate. Those courts that recognize 
problems with the likelihood of confusion test tinker with the factors 
without questioning the test’s exclusive focus on likely confusion and its 
neglect of confusion-related harm.10 Even when courts consider the harm 
from confusion, they do so superficially within the framework of a 
confusion-focused analysis that fails to appreciate the central importance of 
harm to the infringement analysis.11 
All these criticisms reduce to one fundamental point: There is no good 
reason to prevent consumer confusion when it causes very little harm and 
involves no morally blameworthy conduct. This Article aims to correct the 
deficiencies with the likelihood of confusion test. It reconstructs the 
infringement standard based on a clearer understanding of the goals of 
trademark law and a more sensitive account of the costs of enforcing 
trademark rights. 
This Article is divided into four parts. Part I gives a brief overview of 
trademark policy and doctrine as background for the rest of the discussion. 
Part II provides the first comprehensive historical account of the genesis of 
the multifactor likelihood of confusion test. Part II.A describes the 
expansion of trademark rights between 1910 and 1940 to cover 
noncompeting products and the controversy these expansions generated. 
Part II.B describes the sharp conflict that developed in the 1940s and 1950s 
among Second Circuit judges over the proper scope of trademark protection 
for noncompeting products. Part II.C explains how this Second Circuit 
conflict eventually gave birth to the modern multifactor likelihood of 
confusion test in 1961 and 1962. This test emerged as a compromise. It 
patched together factors borrowed from both sides of the Second Circuit 
divide and gave judges broad discretion to balance those factors as they saw 
fit.12 As Part II.D makes clear, this compromise merely papered over the 
disagreement without resolving the underlying normative conflicts, and the 
modern test is still plagued by the disagreements and conflicts that gave it 
birth. 
Part III examines three serious problems with the likelihood of 
confusion test. First, as Part III.A explains, the open-ended and protean 
nature of the test produces bad results by chilling socially valuable uses and 
supporting excessively broad interpretations. Second, as Part III.B explains, 
 
10  See, e.g., Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1148–54 
(9th Cir. 2011) (limiting the Ninth Circuit’s three-factor “Internet troika” mostly to domain name 
disputes and massaging the likelihood of confusion factors to fit keyword advertising cases); Versa 
Prods. Co. v. Bifold Co. (Mfg.), 50 F.3d 189, 202–07 (3d Cir. 1995) (adapting the likelihood of 
confusion factors to product configuration trade dress cases); see also Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. 
LendingTree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 224–28 (3d Cir. 2005) (modifying the likelihood of confusion factors 
for a nominative fair use case). 
11  See, e.g., Hearts on Fire Co. v. Blue Nile, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 274, 286–89 (D. Mass. 2009) 
(proposing a new seven-factor test for cases involving search engine keywords). 
12  See infra notes 148–65 and accompanying text. 
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the likelihood of confusion test is internally incoherent. Some factors, such 
as bridge the gap, comparative product quality, mark strength, and intent, 
have at best a loose connection and at worst no connection at all to 
evaluating likelihood of consumer confusion. Third, as Part III.C explains, 
the test lacks a clear normative foundation with a strong connection to 
trademark law’s purposes. 
Part IV reconstructs the infringement test along more sensible lines. 
Whereas other scholars have proposed mostly ad hoc modifications, this 
Article outlines a systematic approach that fits the infringement standard to 
the moral and economic policies trademark law should serve. Part IV.A 
focuses on moral justifications. It explains why some moral principles 
applied by the courts, such as the anti-free-riding principle, cannot do the 
work they are supposed to do, while others, such as the principle 
prohibiting intentional deception, can. In those cases involving a moral 
wrong capable of grounding trademark liability, the relevant moral 
principles should govern the liability determination. 
Part IV.B focuses on economic justifications. It explains why, from an 
economic perspective, the goal must be to minimize expected harm rather 
than reduce likely confusion, and it outlines an infringement test that 
furthers this goal. Part IV.B also critically examines proposals to add some 
version of a materiality requirement to trademark law. Although these 
proposals have merit, they also overlook some of the complex ways that the 
information transmission function of marks can be impaired. 
I. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF TRADEMARK POLICY AND DOCTRINE 
The following discussion summarizes basic trademark policy and 
doctrine as background for the analysis in the rest of the Article. In 
particular, Part I.A briefly presents the main policies underlying trademark 
law, and Part I.B summarizes the principal doctrines relevant to acquiring 
rights and proving infringement. 
A. Policy 
Although Part IV delves into the policies underlying trademark law in 
more detail, it is useful to provide a brief overview at the outset.13 
Trademarks are words or symbols that consumers use to identify a single 
source of goods or services.14 For example, CREST functions as a 
trademark because consumers believe that every tube of toothpaste marked 
CREST comes from the same source as every other tube with the same 
 
13  For a comprehensive overview of these policies, see Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and 
Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV. 2099, 2104–14 (2004). 
14  See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995). I use the term 
“trademark” to denote any mark that functions as a source identifier, including marks used for services 
and businesses as well as for goods and including logos and trade dress in addition to more conventional 
word marks. 
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mark. When a mark uniquely identifies a source in this way, consumers are 
able to rely on the mark to retrieve information about the product they wish 
to buy. For example, a consumer contemplating which brand of toothpaste 
to buy can use the CREST mark to retrieve information about Crest 
toothpaste that she has learned from advertising, word-of-mouth, or past 
experience. She is then able to apply this information to the particular 
purchase she is about to make, confident that the toothpaste on the shelf 
marked CREST will have the qualities that she expects from Crest 
toothpaste. In this way, trademarks reduce the costs to consumers of 
searching for product information. 
Marks serve this search-cost-reduction function, however, only if a 
trademark owner can stop others from using the same mark on competing 
products. For example, if a firm other than Proctor & Gamble could call its 
toothpaste CREST, consumers would no longer be able to rely on the 
CREST mark to indicate a single source and thus a guarantee of uniform 
quality. As a result, they would have to use other, presumably more costly, 
ways to verify product attributes, which would increase consumer search 
costs. Moreover, without trademark protection, sellers would find it 
difficult to inform consumers about high-quality features of their products 
that are hidden from view before purchase. If firms cannot communicate 
high quality to consumers, their incentives to produce high-quality products 
will diminish. 
These are the standard economic arguments for trademark law: 
protecting the exclusivity of marks reduces consumer search costs and 
supports incentives to maintain and improve product quality by facilitating 
the communication of quality-related information to consumers.15 The 
Supreme Court has put its stamp of approval on these rationales.16 And they 
have had a major impact on trademark scholarship.17 
There are also moral arguments for trademark protection. When a firm 
uses a mark with intent to deceive consumers, the presence of intent invites 
the application of moral norms against deliberate lying. Moreover, 
trademark law protects sellers as well as consumers. It allows mark owners 
to stop others from injuring or appropriating the goodwill associated with 
their marks.18 I explore these moral arguments with some care in Part IV 
below. 
 
15  See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 166–68 (2003); 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 3:5 (4th ed. 2009). 
16  See, e.g., Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 163–64. 
17  See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 15, at 166–209; Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, A 
Search-Costs Theory of Limiting Doctrines in Trademark Law, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 1223 (2007); 
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367 (1999). 
18  See Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 163–64. 
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B. Doctrine 
To prevail in a trademark infringement suit, a firm must prove (1) that 
it owns the exclusive rights in the mark and (2) that the defendant’s use of a 
similar mark infringes those rights.19 
1. Ownership of Exclusive Rights.—The requirements for proving 
ownership vary with the type of mark. Marks are divided into five 
categories: fanciful, arbitrary, suggestive, descriptive, and generic.20 A 
“fanciful” mark is a made-up word or symbol, such as POLAROID or 
KODAK, and an “arbitrary” mark is an existing word or symbol that bears 
no relationship to the product, such as SUN for computers.21 A “suggestive” 
mark is a word or symbol that communicates information about the product 
by way of suggestion rather than outright description.22 For example, 
COPPERTONE is a suggestive mark for suntan lotion because it takes 
some imagination to connect the ordinary meaning of “copper” and “tone” 
with the product.23 A “descriptive” mark is a word or symbol that directly 
describes qualities of the product without any need for imagination. For 
example, FISH-FRI is a descriptive mark for a batter mix used to fry fish.24 
Finally, a “generic” mark is a word or phrase that refers to a class of 
products rather than a single brand within that class. For example, 
THERMOS is generic for a vacuum-insulated bottle because “thermos” is 
the term that consumers use to refer to any such bottle regardless of the 
brand.25 
Fanciful, arbitrary, and suggestive marks are collectively known as 
inherently distinctive marks.26 A plaintiff establishes exclusive ownership in 
an inherently distinctive mark by proving that she was the first to use it in 
trade.27 There is no need to prove that the word or symbol is actually 
functioning as a source identifier.28 The theory is that consumers noticing a 
conspicuous word or symbol that does not describe the product will 
naturally conclude that it is meant to serve as a mark and treat it as such.29 
 
19  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 20 (1995). 
20  See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992) (citing Abercrombie & Fitch 
Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976)); see also 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 11:1. 
21  See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 11:4. The ordinary meaning of “sun” obviously says nothing 
about computers. 
22  See, e.g., Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 791 (5th Cir. 1983) 
(describing the leap-of-imagination and other tests used to distinguish suggestive from descriptive 
marks). 
23  Id. (citing Douglas Labs., Corp. v. Copper Tan, Inc., 210 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1954)). 
24  Id. at 790, 792–93. 
25  King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577, 579 (2d Cir. 1963). 
26  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 210–12 (2000). 
27  See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 11:4. 
28  See id. 
29  See Wal-Mart Stores, 529 U.S. at 212. 
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Descriptive marks work differently. A firm establishes ownership of a 
descriptive mark by proving that it was the first to develop “secondary 
meaning” in the mark.30 Secondary meaning exists when a substantial 
fraction of the consuming public actually uses the mark to designate a 
single source of the product.31 The idea is that consumers seeing a 
descriptive word or symbol might think it is meant to be a descriptor rather 
than a source identifier. Accordingly, trademark law demands that owners 
prove that consumers actually use the word or symbol to identify a 
particular source.32 
Finally, generic marks, unlike inherently distinctive and descriptive 
marks, cannot be owned as trademarks.33 Since a generic mark is a word (or 
symbol) that designates a product class, competitors need the word (or 
symbol) to inform consumers of the type of product they are selling. As a 
result, giving one seller exclusive rights would impede competition.34 
2. Infringement.—Once a firm establishes exclusive ownership of a 
mark, it must prove that the defendant’s use of a similar mark infringes its 
rights. In most trademark cases, infringement is established by showing that 
the defendant’s use is likely to confuse an appreciable number of consumers 
into believing that the plaintiff is the source of the defendant’s products, or 
sponsors or is somehow affiliated with the defendant or its products.35 There 
is no need to show that consumers are actually confused; a significant 
likelihood is enough for liability.36 Nor need the plaintiff show that a large 
 
30  2 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 16:34. 
31  See Vincent N. Palladino, Surveying Secondary Meaning, 84 TRADEMARK REP. 155, 160–62 
(1994) (surveying the different definitions of secondary meaning). 
32  See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 15:5. 
33  Id. § 12:1. 
34  See id. § 12:2. 
35  See 4 id. §§ 23:1–:4. By “product,” I mean any good or service. While this Article considers only 
confusion-based theories, it is worth mentioning that trademark law also imposes liability for dilution, 
which does not require confusion. Dilution occurs when the defendant’s use impairs the mark’s selling 
power either by tarnishing it with unsavory associations or by blurring its distinctiveness with multiple 
uses on different products. See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 429–30 (2003), 
superseded by statute, Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, § 2(1), 120 Stat. 
1730. Focusing on confusion-based theories makes sense because they comprise the core of trademark 
infringement. Dilution has very limited scope. Indeed, dilution theories have been extremely 
controversial ever since the idea was first suggested by Frank Schechter in 1927 and first codified by 
Massachusetts in 1947. See generally Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of 
Goodwill in Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 604–06 (2006) [hereinafter Bone, Hunting Goodwill] 
(describing the history of dilution law, including the adoption of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act in 
1995); Robert G. Bone, Schechter’s Ideas in Historical Context and Dilution’s Rocky Road, 24 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 469 (2008) [hereinafter Bone, Schechter’s Ideas] (describing 
Schechter’s jurisprudence and analyzing the impact of his dilution theory). 
36  See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 23:12. However, instances of actual confusion can be 
probative of likely confusion. See id. § 23:13. And a plaintiff must prove actual confusion and resulting 
harm to recover damages. See 5 id. § 30:74. 
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fraction of consumers are at risk of being confused. Some courts have found 
liability with survey evidence showing only 10% to 15%.37 
As noted above, courts determine likelihood of confusion by applying 
a multifactor test, and the factors vary from circuit to circuit.38 Most 
versions of the test include the strength of the plaintiff’s mark, the similarity 
of the marks, the proximity or similarity of the plaintiff’s and the 
defendant’s products, evidence of actual confusion among consumers, and 
the defendant’s intent.39 A court is supposed to consider the reactions of 
“ordinary consumers” when they see the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s 
marks as they usually appear in the marketplace.40 Beyond these simple 
rules, trial courts have broad discretion to apply the multifactor test on a 
case-by-case basis.41 
Finally, courts today recognize different types of actionable 
confusion.42 “Source confusion” lies at the heart of trademark law. It exists 
when the defendant’s use of a similar mark leads consumers to believe that 
the plaintiff is actually selling the defendant’s products.43 “Sponsorship 
confusion” goes further and expands trademark rights beyond source 
confusion. When the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s products do not 
compete, consumers might know that the plaintiff is not the actual seller but 
still be confused into believing that the plaintiff is sponsoring, endorsing, or 
somehow affiliated with the defendant or its products. Sponsorship 
confusion can harm consumers if they buy the defendant’s lower quality 
product expecting the same high quality as the plaintiff’s.44 It can also harm 
trademark owners if consumers think less of the owner and its products as a 
result.45 In addition to expanding confusion along the product dimension, 
courts have also expanded it along the temporal dimension by recognizing 
confusion not only at the time of purchase, but also before purchase (initial-
interest confusion) and after purchase (post-sale confusion).46 I shall say 
more about these different types of confusion later.47 
 
37  4 id. § 23:2 & n.3; 6 id. § 32:188. 
38  4 id. §§ 24:29–:43; Beebe, supra note 1, at 1584. 
39  Beebe, supra note 1, at 1589, 1591. 
40  Malletier v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp., 426 F.3d 532, 538–39 (2d Cir. 2005). 
41  Moreover, the scope of appellate review is quite narrow and leaves wide latitude for trial judges 
to apply the test as they see fit. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 23:73 (noting that most circuits use a 
clearly erroneous standard of review, at least for reviewing the district court’s evaluation of the 
underlying factors and also, in many jurisdictions, for reviewing the ultimate balance). 
42  See id. §§ 23:5–:8, 24:6. 
43  Id. § 24:6. 
44  Indeed, some courts and commentators argue that consumers are harmed simply by being 
confused or deceived, even when the defendant’s product is not of lower quality. See id. § 24:16. 
45  See id. § 24:15. 
46  See id. §§ 23:6–:7. 
47  Although it is not relevant to this Article, I should mention, for the sake of completeness, that 
courts recognize another type of confusion known as reverse confusion. Id. § 23:10. In his treatise on 
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II. HISTORY OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION TEST 
As I explain in Part III below, the likelihood of confusion test is deeply 
flawed. Before describing these flaws, however, it is important to take a 
careful look at the history of the test. This history reveals a great deal about 
why the test is so problematic and points the way toward sensible solutions. 
A. 1910–1940: Trademark Protection Against Noncompeting Uses 
Until the early twentieth century, trademark protection was limited to 
source confusion and uses of marks on directly competing goods.48 This 
made sense in a world where most firms manufactured and sold a single 
product.49 In the early twentieth century, however, firms began to integrate 
horizontally, and consumers gradually came to expect that the same firm 
might sell different products.50 The direct competition requirement fit these 
changing market conditions very poorly. As a result, courts gradually 
expanded protection to include use of marks on noncompeting products that 
were closely enough related so that consumers might believe that the 
plaintiff actually sold the defendant’s products (source confusion) or that 
the plaintiff sponsored, endorsed, or was somehow affiliated with them 
(sponsorship confusion).51 One commentator at the time justified the 
expansion as protecting the trademark owner’s goodwill from reputation 
injury and protecting consumers from deception.52 
By the late 1920s, trademark protection against noncompeting goods 
was so firmly established that courts were willing to state the principles in 
broad language and commentators were willing to call for even broader 
expansions.53 For example, in 1927, Frank Schechter published his famous 
dilution article, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, in which he 
 
trademark law, Thomas McCarthy explains that “reverse confusion occurs when the junior user’s 
advertising and promotion so swamps the senior user’s reputation in the market that customers are likely 
to be confused into thinking that the senior user’s goods are those of the junior user: the reverse of 
traditional confusion.” Id. Thus, a small firm at risk of being swamped by a large firm can enjoin use of 
the mark on the ground of likelihood of reverse confusion. 
48  See, e.g., Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden’s Condensed Milk Co., 201 F. 510, 514–15 (7th Cir. 
1912). 
49  See 3 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 730 cmt. a (1938) (referring to this as “[t]he oldest and simplest 
case of infringement”). 
50  See Edward C. Lukens, The Application of the Principles of Unfair Competition to Cases of 
Dissimilar Products, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 197, 204–05 (1927). 
51  One of the earliest and most famous decisions reflecting this expansion is Aunt Jemima Mills Co. 
v. Rigney & Co., 247 F. 407 (2d Cir. 1917). The plaintiff sold flour and the defendant sold pancake 
syrup. Id. at 408. The Second Circuit reasoned that the goods were so closely related—they were often 
used together—that the defendant’s use of the same mark might lead consumers of the plaintiff’s flour to 
believe that the plaintiff sold the defendant’s syrup. Id. at 409–10. 
52  Lukens, supra note 50, at 198–99, 205. 
53  Id. at 200 (“It is now established beyond controversy that the products need not be the same, in 
order that relief may be granted.” (footnote omitted)). 
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argued for extremely broad trademark protection to preserve the 
distinctiveness and commercial magnetism of marks without regard to 
consumer confusion.54 Moreover, the Second Circuit, in a famous Judge 
Learned Hand opinion, Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson, endorsed a very 
broad approach to extending trademark protection to noncompeting 
products.55 The court even suggested that the mere appropriation of a mark, 
and thus of a firm’s reputation—indeed, its identity—ought to be enough 
for liability.56 
However, starting in the mid-1930s and accelerating through the 
1940s, some courts, especially the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, began 
to take a more restrained approach to protecting marks against uses on 
noncompeting products. The first signs of this development manifested as 
early as 1934, in L. E. Waterman Co. v. Gordon.57 Judge Learned Hand 
wrote the opinion for the Waterman court and took the opportunity, just six 
years after his Yale Electric opinion, to confine the broad reach of Yale 
Electric’s language. To obtain trademark protection against noncompeting 
uses, Judge Hand emphasized, a trademark owner had to show that a 
remedy would either prevent tarnishment of its reputation or protect its 
plans to enter the defendant’s product market.58 These two interests—
protecting reputation and avoiding market foreclosure—would figure 
prominently in Judge Hand’s more restrictive opinions of the 1940s. 
Perhaps the most important development during this period occurred in 
1938 with the publication of Chapter 35 of the Restatement of Torts, dealing 
with the law of trademark infringement.59 The Restatement offered the first 
multifactor test for infringement, which, as we shall see, influenced the 
creation of the modern multifactor test in the early 1960s.60 The 
Restatement’s test appears in five sections of Chapter 35. Three of these 
sections deal with the core case of competing products, and two deal with 
noncompeting products.61 
 
54  Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813 (1927). 
See generally Bone, Schechter’s Ideas, supra note 35 (analyzing Schechter’s dilution theory and tying it 
to his jurisprudential views). 
55  26 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1928) (holding that the mark YALE for flashlights was confusingly similar 
to the plaintiff’s use of YALE for locks and denying registration under the 1905 Trademark Act); see 
also Bone, Hunting Goodwill, supra note 35, at 594–96 (discussing the case and quoting from Judge 
Learned Hand’s opinion). 
56  Yale Electric, 26 F.2d at 974. 
57  72 F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1934). The plaintiff used WATERMAN for fountain pens and other writing 
implements and sought to enjoin the defendant from using the mark for razor blades. Id. at 273. 
58  Id. at 274. 
59  3 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 715–756 (1938). Actually the Restatement addresses infringement 
of both “trade-marks” and “trade names,” although the distinction is not significant here. See id. § 716 
cmt. a. See generally infra notes 90–96 and accompanying text (explaining the distinction). 
60  See infra Part II.C. 
61  See 3 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 717, 728–729 (1938) (competing products); id. §§ 730–731 
(noncompeting products). 
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Section 717 states the general rule for competing products: A 
defendant is liable for using a designation that is “identical with or 
confusingly similar to” another’s mark.62 Section 728 defines a “confusingly 
similar” mark as a mark that is likely to cause source confusion,63 and 
section 729 lists four factors for determining whether source confusion is 
likely.64 With regard to uses on noncompeting products, section 730 
imposes liability only if consumers are likely to “associate[]” the 
defendant’s different product with the “source identified by the [mark].”65 
And section 731 lists nine factors for determining whether such an 
association is likely.66 All of the factors were derived from the existing 
precedent.67 
Interestingly, in contrast to the single multifactor test customarily used 
today,68 the Restatement used two distinct multifactor tests, one for 
“confusing similarity” when products compete and the other for “confusing 
association” when products do not compete.69 Given the prevailing 
uncertainty in the 1930s about how far trademark protection should extend 
 
62  Id. § 717(1)(a), (2)(a) (“One infringes another’s [trade-mark or] trade name, if . . . he uses . . . a 
designation which is identical with or confusingly similar to the other’s [trade-mark or] trade 
name . . . .”). 
63  Id. § 728 (“A designation is confusingly similar . . . if prospective purchasers are likely to regard 
it as indicating the source identified by the [plaintiff’s mark].”). 
64  Id. § 729. Slightly paraphrased, the four factors are: (1) the degree of similarity between the 
marks (in appearance, pronunciation, verbal translation, or suggestion); (2) the defendant’s intent; 
(3) “the relation in use and manner of marketing;” and (4) “the degree of care likely to be exercised by 
purchasers.” Id. 
65  Id. § 730(b) (stating that protection extends to “goods, services, or businesses which, in view of 
the [mark] used by the [defendant], are likely to be regarded by prospective purchasers as associated 
with the source identified by the trade-mark or trade name”). 
66  Id. § 731. Slightly paraphrased, the nine factors are: (1) the likelihood that the defendant’s goods, 
services, or business will be mistaken for the plaintiff’s; (2) the likelihood that the plaintiff will expand 
its business so as to compete with the defendant; (3) the extent to which the goods or services of the 
defendant and those of the plaintiff have common purchasers; (4) the extent to which the plaintiff’s and 
the defendant’s goods or services are marketed through the same channels; (5) the relation between the 
functions of the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s goods or services; (6) the degree of distinctiveness of the 
mark; (7) the degree of attention usually given to trade symbols in the purchase of the plaintiff’s and the 
defendant’s goods or services; (8) the length of time that the defendant has used the mark; and (9) the 
defendant’s intent. Id. 
67  For example, it is clear from the Explanatory Notes appended to Tentative Draft 17 that the 
section 731 factors are a synthesis of the noncompeting product precedents. See RESTATEMENT OF 
TORTS § 3-24 explanatory note (Tentative Draft No. 17, 1938). 
68  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 21 (1995) (adopting a single 
multifactor test). But see id. § 21 cmt. b & reporters’ note b (noting that application of the test is simpler 
when products compete). 
69  Neither section 729 nor section 731 is expressly limited in this way. However, the simple, four-
factor test only makes sense for competing products, and the more complicated nine-factor test was 
clearly designed for noncompeting products. 
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to noncompeting products, it is not surprising that the drafters would 
address these cases with a separate section and a separate test.70 
The most important thing about the Restatement’s approach is its 
rationale for extending trademark protection to noncompeting products. The 
drafters were clear that not just any confusion would trigger liability. 
Actionable confusion had to place the trademark owner’s reputation at risk 
by creating the possibility that consumers who had bad experiences with the 
defendant’s product would associate those experiences with the plaintiff 
because of their false beliefs about source or affiliation.71 Thus, the 
Restatement drafters did not envision confusion by itself as the trigger of 
liability, but rather confusion that was likely to create reputation harm.72 
To be sure, the limitations were framed in terms of harm to the 
trademark owner rather than harm to consumers. At the time, trademark law 
combined a consumer-protection strand with a seller-protection strand.73 
The goal was to protect consumers against harmful confusion and also to 
protect sellers from injury to and even appropriation of their goodwill and 
reputation.74 These two strands converged when, as in the typical case, the 
defendant took or injured the trademark owner’s goodwill by misleading 
consumers about source and quality.75 
The Restatement’s focus on reputation harm anticipates the more 
restrictive approach to product market expansion advocated during the 
 
70  Today, the basic infringement rule is stated not in terms of confusingly similar marks, but rather 
in terms of the likelihood of consumer confusion under all the circumstances. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 20. 
71  See 3 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 730 cmt. b (1938); see also id. § 731 cmt. c (justifying the 
likelihood of expansion factor as relevant to likelihood of consumer association and also to the 
“difficulty [that] would be caused if normal expansion . . . were impeded”). It is also worth noting that 
sections 730 and 731 were presented as limiting protection rather than expanding it. Id. § 730 cmt. b. 
72  Id. § 730 cmt. a. Although liability turned on likely confusion, the type of confusion deemed 
actionable (confusion of “association”) and the factors considered relevant were chosen with the risk of 
reputation harm in mind. See id. § 730 cmt. b (“[I]f lipsticks are marketed under a designation 
confusingly similar to a trade-mark for steam shovels, it is not likely that the market reputation of the 
steam shovels would thereby share in the market vicissitudes of the lipsticks.”). 
73  See Bone, Hunting Goodwill, supra note 35, at 560. 
74  These elements are distinct from the trademark owner’s standing to sue. Even if trademark law 
had been exclusively about protecting consumers, the trademark owner would still have had to prove 
that it was harmed in order to have standing to sue. See, e.g., Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden’s 
Condensed Milk Co., 201 F. 510, 513–14 (7th Cir. 1912); Bone, Hunting Goodwill, supra note 35, at 
560–61 & n.58 (explaining the distinction between standing and harm). 
75  For example, the only way a trademark owner could suffer reputation harm was if consumers 
were misled into assuming an association and thus expecting a certain level of quality from the 
defendant’s products. However, in some noncompeting products cases, protecting goodwill took center 
stage without any serious reputation risk or any realistic possibility of market expansion, and these were 
the cases that generated the most intense controversy. See Bone, Hunting Goodwill, supra note 35, at 
598. 
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1940s by Judges Learned Hand and Jerome Frank on the Second Circuit.76 
These two judges limited a trademark’s reach by demanding a particularly 
strong showing of harm to the trademark owner.77 Harkening back to 
Waterman, they focused on two types of harm: reputation and market 
foreclosure.78 The following section tells this part of the story. 
B. 1940–1960: Conflict in the Second Circuit 
Concerns about trademark monopolies intensified at the end of the 
1930s and throughout the 1940s.79 A growing number of noted economists 
and legal scholars complained that protecting powerful marks could create 
barriers to market entry and produce socially undesirable monopolies.80 The 
main source of concern was the rapidly growing use of psychological 
advertising, which relied on imagery and suggestion to appeal to basic 
human emotions, needs, and desires.81 Critics argued that this new type of 
advertising invested marks with the power to grip consumers on an 
emotional level. As a result, a consumer might become attached to a brand 
for irrational reasons and insist on buying it even when an identical product 
was available at a lower price.82 
These concerns had a particularly strong impact on Judges Hand and 
Frank.83 The following discussion recounts their efforts to control monopoly 
costs through gatekeeping requirements and describes Judge Charles 
Clark’s strong opposition to their approach. The discussion focuses on the 
Second Circuit for three main reasons.84 First, during the mid-twentieth 
 
76  Notably Judge Learned Hand was one of seven advisors for Chapter 35 of the Restatement, which 
covered trademark law. See 3 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS iv. 
77  See infra notes 100–26 and accompanying text. 
78  See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text (discussing the Waterman case). 
79  See Bone, Hunting Goodwill, supra note 35, at 590–92. 
80  See, e.g., RAYMOND T. BYE, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 449 (rev. ed. 1932); EDWARD 
CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 56–70, 205 (2d ed. 1936); Floyd A. 
Wright, The Nature and Basis of Legal Goodwill, 24 ILL. L. REV. 20, 40 (1929). 
81  See, e.g., Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade 
Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1168–73 (1948) (criticizing the persuasive function of advertising for 
creating monopoly power through marks); see also Bone, Hunting Goodwill, supra note 35, at 579–82 
(describing the rise of psychological advertising in the 1920s). 
82  See, e.g., CHAMBERLIN, supra note 80, at 61–62; Brown, supra note 81, at 1168–69, 1190. 
83  Today, critics of broad protection focus on a different set of concerns: chilling expression, 
impeding creative use of the Internet, restricting competition and innovation, and monopolizing 
merchandising markets. See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: 
Fragile Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461, 471–89 (2005) (monopolizing merchandising 
markets); Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 507, 573–
74 (2005) (impeding Internet uses that improve competition); McGeveran, supra note 3, at 61–66 
(chilling expression). Nevertheless, the source of the problems is the same: the power that exclusive 
rights confer on trademark owners and the ways that excessively broad rights can be used strategically. 
84  Others have written about the Second Circuit rift over trademark law during the 1940–1960 
period. See, e.g., 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, §§ 24:55–:60; Richard L. Kirkpatrick, Learned Hand’s 
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century, the Second Circuit was perhaps the most distinguished lower 
federal court in the nation, and it was particularly influential in the area of 
trademark law.85 Second, courts in other circuits struggled with the same 
policy tensions, and several were influenced directly by Second Circuit 
precedent.86 The result was serious intra- and intercircuit conflict that 
divided along lines similar to those that divided the Second Circuit.87 
Finally, and most important, the Second Circuit case law that developed 
during the 1940s and 1950s spawned the first likelihood of confusion test 
that subsequently influenced the development of similar tests elsewhere.88 
 
Trademark Cases: An Appreciation, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 426, 434–36 (1992); Kenneth L. Port, 
Learned Hand’s Trademark Jurisprudence: Legal Positivism and the Myth of the Prophet, 27 PAC. L.J. 
221, 252–60 (1996). However, none of these accounts is as careful and comprehensive as the history I 
present here, especially on the normative level. Nor do any of them connect the earlier developments to 
the likelihood of confusion test, as this Article does. 
85  See JEFFREY B. MORRIS, FEDERAL JUSTICE IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT 123, 162 (1987); see also 
Edward McWhinney, A Legal Realist and a Humanist—Cross-Currents in the Legal Philosophy of 
Judge Jerome Frank, 33 IND. L.J. 111, 115 & n.8 (1957) (reviewing JEROME FRANK & BARBARA 
FRANK, NOT GUILTY (1957)) (describing the court as “the strongest tribunal of the English-speaking 
world”). In 1941, the Second Circuit had six permanent judgeships occupied by Learned Hand, 
Augustus Noble Hand, Thomas Swan, Jerome Frank, Charles Clark, and Harrie B. Chase. MORRIS, 
supra, at 136, 143. Learned Hand had served on the court since 1924 and had developed a reputation as 
a highly distinguished jurist. Id. at 138–39. Jerome Frank was appointed in 1941 and before that was an 
important figure in the legal realist movement and a highly regarded lawyer who served in a number of 
important positions in the Roosevelt Administration. Id. at 145–46. Charles Clark, a moderate realist, 
had been Dean of the Yale Law School and was a major figure in federal procedural reform, having 
served as Reporter to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules during the 1930s. Id. at 143–44. 
86  See, e.g., S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Johnson, 266 F.2d 129, 137 (6th Cir. 1959) (relying on 
Second Circuit opinions by Hand for a narrow approach to noncompeting products); Pure Foods, Inc. v. 
Minute Maid Corp., 214 F.2d 792, 797 & n.6 (5th Cir. 1954) (mentioning the “Hand Doctrine” without 
expressing an opinion on the approach and pointing explicitly to “the strong dissenting opinion of Judge 
Clark”); Sunbeam Furniture Corp. v. Sunbeam Corp., 191 F.2d 141, 144–45 (9th Cir. 1951) (noting, in 
reliance on a Judge Hand opinion, that the Lanham Act does not “stifle all excursions into adjacent 
markets” (quoting S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Johnson (Johnson II), 175 F.2d 176, 180 (2d Cir. 1949), 
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949)); Hanson v. Triangle Publ’ns, Inc., 163 F.2d 74 (8th Cir. 1947) 
(considering a noncompeting goods case, with the majority applying a broad view and the dissent 
applying a narrow view); Horlick’s Malted Milk Corp. v. Horlick, 143 F.2d 32, 36 (7th Cir. 1944) 
(citing Second Circuit precedent for the requirement that the plaintiff show likely market entry or need 
to preserve its identity in the defendant’s market, and indicating concerns about monopoly); Nat’l Fruit 
Prod. Co. v. Dwinell-Wright Co., 47 F. Supp. 499, 505–06 (D. Mass. 1942) (noting that Judge Hand’s 
Second Circuit opinions “have become classics of trade-mark law” and recounting the growing concern 
about trademark monopolies). 
87  For an account of these conflicts and splits, see Julius R. Lunsford, Jr., The Lanham Trade-Mark 
Act—Conflict and Dissent, 43 TRADEMARK REP. 995, 997–1019 (1953) (endorsing the more expansive 
approach and noting that “[t]he restrictionists . . . advocate that . . . the public interest is better served 
when no one has an exclusive right in a trade-mark”); Sergei S. Zlinkoff, Monopoly Versus Competition: 
Significant Trends in Patent, Anti-Trust, Trademark, and Unfair Competition Suits, 53 YALE L.J. 514, 
538–46 (1944) (noting a restrictive trend in the federal courts and using an opinion by Judge Hand as 
illustrative, referring to it as “[o]ne of the most illuminating opinions dealing with the issues”). 
88  See infra notes 148–65 and accompanying text. 
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As we shall see, tracing the test’s genesis through Second Circuit precedent 
sheds useful light on its current ills. 
1. 1940–1953: A Rift Develops.—This section first discusses Judge 
Hand’s and Judge Frank’s restrictive views concerning product market 
expansion and then examines Judge Clark’s more generous approach. 
Before proceeding, however, it is important to be clear that the debate over 
noncompeting products was limited to descriptive, geographic, and personal 
name marks. More precisely, it had to do with the scope of the “unfair 
competition” tort in protecting “trade names” and had nothing to do with 
the tort of “trade-mark infringement.”89 To explain this distinction, we need 
to review some old terminology. 
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, what we call 
trademark law today was divided into two parts.90 The law of “trade-mark 
infringement” included the rules for protecting fanciful, arbitrary, and 
suggestive word marks, which were known as “technical trade-marks,” or 
“trade-marks” for short.91 The law of “unfair competition” included the 
rules for protecting descriptive, geographic, and personal name marks, 
which were known as “trade names.”92 
In the late nineteenth century, the tort of trade-mark infringement was 
based on a formalistic property theory.93 A firm secured ownership of a 
fanciful, arbitrary, or suggestive mark simply by using the mark in trade 
without any need to show secondary meaning.94 Anyone who used an 
identical or nearly identical mark on directly competing goods infringed the 
owner’s property right and was liable without regard to likely confusion. 
The tort of unfair competition worked differently. Because a trade 
name had a primary meaning as an ordinary descriptive, geographical, or 
personal name designation, establishing ownership required a showing that 
the prospective owner had developed a “secondary meaning” in the trade 
name so that it also identified a single source.95 Moreover, to obtain relief, 
the owner of a trade name had to prove likelihood of consumer confusion.96 
In short, trade-marks were protected on a property theory, while trade 
names were protected on a tort theory of unfair competition. 
By the 1930s and 1940s, many courts and commentators rejected the 
formalistic property theory and treated trade-mark infringement and unfair 
 
89  See infra note 98 and accompanying text. 
90  Elsewhere I have explained the distinctions among “technical trademarks,” “trade names,” 
“trademark infringement,” and “unfair competition.” See Bone, Hunting Goodwill, supra note 35, at 
563–67. 
91  Id. at 563–64. 
92  Id. at 565. 
93  Id. at 562. 
94  Id. at 563–65. 
95  Id. at 565–66. 
96  Id. at 566. 
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competition as two branches of a single legal theory based on protecting 
marks against likely confusion.97 However, the old terminology remained, 
and so too did the assumption that “trade-marks” (i.e., fanciful, arbitrary, 
and suggestive word marks) had a stronger claim to protection than “trade 
names” (i.e., descriptive, geographic, and personal name marks). Perhaps 
for this reason, Judges Hand and Frank focused their concerns on trade-
name monopolies. Use of a fanciful, arbitrary, or suggestive mark—in other 
words, a “trade-mark”—so obviously reeked of bad faith, and the defendant 
had so many viable alternatives, that Judge Hand, for one, could see little 
justification for permitting the defendant’s use.98 
a. Judge Learned Hand and Judge Jerome Frank.—The fact 
that Judge Learned Hand was an early proponent of the restrictive approach 
is a bit ironic given his eagerness in Yale Electric to embrace broad 
noncompeting market protection.99 But the monopoly concerns voiced 
during the 1930s obviously had an effect. Judge Hand laid the groundwork 
for his restrictive approach as early as 1939.100 But he developed it in more 
detail in four opinions issued during the 1940s.101 
Judge Hand’s approach required a strong showing of harm to one of 
the two interests identified in the earlier Waterman case: the mark owner’s 
interest in preventing injury to reputation, or its interest in entering the 
defendant’s market.102 In its mature form, the analysis involved a case-
specific balancing that weighed harm to the mark owner’s interest in 
reputation or expansion against harm to the defendant’s legitimate interest 
in continued use of the mark.103 In striking this balance, Judge Hand insisted 
from the beginning that there be more than an abstract risk of reputation 
 
97  Id. at 585–89. 
98  See, e.g., Durable Toy & Novelty Corp. v. J. Chein & Co., 133 F.2d 853, 855 (2d Cir. 1943) 
(noting that, in the case of a coined mark, “it will be hard indeed for the newcomer to find any excuse 
for invading it”); Emerson Electric Mfg. Co. v. Emerson Radio & Phonograph Corp., 105 F.2d 908, 910, 
911 (2d Cir. 1939) (noting that cases involving trade-marks “offer no difficulty” because the defendant 
is usually a “mere pirate” without any “excuse” for using the mark, and use “almost inevitably” involves 
“fraud”). 
99  See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text. 
100  See Emerson Electric, 105 F.2d at 910–11 (noting the need for a case-specific balancing of 
competing interests in addition to likely confusion); see also Landers, Frary & Clark v. Universal Cooler 
Corp., 85 F.2d 46, 48 (2d Cir. 1936) (identifying two “interests” that support protecting a mark on 
noncompeting goods—reputation and market expansion—but taking a broader approach than in later 
cases). 
101  S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Johnson (Johnson II), 175 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1949); Dwinell-Wright 
Co. v. White House Milk Co., 132 F.2d 822, 825 (2d Cir. 1943); Durable Toy & Novelty, 133 F.2d at 
853; S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Johnson (Johnson I), 116 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1940). 
102  See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text (discussing L. E. Waterman Co. v. Gordon, 72 
F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1934)). 
103  See, e.g., Fed. Tel. & Radio Corp. v. Fed. Television Corp., 180 F.2d 250, 251–52 (2d Cir. 
1950); Johnson II, 175 F.2d at 179–80. 
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harm or a mere possibility of market entry by the plaintiff.104 And as of the 
late 1940s, he required actual reputation injury or actual plans to enter the 
market, especially when the plaintiff’s mark was weak or the defendant 
used it in good faith and had a legitimate reason to continue its use.105 
In several opinions, Judge Hand clearly stated his goal as limiting 
trade-name monopolies to cases where there was a strong social benefit. In 
a 1940 opinion, he cautioned against the tendency to grant monopolies 
based on a misguided property theory: 
There is always the danger that we may be merely granting a monopoly, based 
upon the notion that by advertising one can obtain some “property” in a name. 
We are nearly sure to go astray in any phase of the whole subject, as soon as 
we lose sight of the underlying principle that the wrong involved is diverting 
trade from the first user by misleading customers who mean to deal with 
him.106 
Hand found a powerful ally when Jerome Frank was appointed to the 
Second Circuit in 1941. Judge Frank never authored a majority opinion in a 
major noncompeting-products case, but he did join with Judge Hand in 
several trademark decisions, including two that developed Hand’s 
restrictive approach.107 Judge Frank also stated his views clearly and 
 
104  See Johnson I, 116 F.2d at 429. In Johnson I, Judge Hand made a point of saying “we should not 
forget that, so long as the newcomer has not in fact misconducted himself, the injury [to reputation] is 
prospective and contingent, and very different from taking away the first user’s customers.” Id. As for 
the expansion interest, he cautioned against giving protection on the basis of “nothing more than the 
desire to post the new market as a possible preserve which [the trademark owner] may later choose to 
exploit.” Id. 
105  See, e.g., Fed. Tel. & Radio Corp., 180 F.2d at 251–52 (denying an injunction against use of 
FEDERAL for television sets and arguing that the plaintiff had no present interest in selling television 
sets, there was no evidence of any actual reputation harm, the defendant “started the user in entire good 
faith,” and “the word [Federal] is in general use for all sorts of purposes”); Johnson II, 175 F.2d at 180 
(denying an injunction against use of the mark JOHNSON for cleaning fluid and arguing that the 
plaintiff had no current plans to sell cleaning fluid, there was no evidence that the defendant’s use had 
actually tarnished the plaintiff’s reputation, and the defendant had used his personal name as a mark for 
three years before the plaintiff sued). 
106  Johnson I, 116 F.2d at 429; see also Johnson II, 175 F.2d at 179 (noting that granting protection 
without harm would “frequently result in great hardship to others, and give to the first user of a mark a 
wholly unjustified power to preempt new markets”). 
107  For the restrictive approach cases authored by Judge Hand and joined by Judge Frank, see 
Durable Toy & Novelty Corp. v. J. Chein & Co., 133 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1943) (applying the restrictive 
view to a case involving only reputation harm and no lost sales), and Dwinell-Wright Co. v. White 
House Milk Co., 132 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1943) (strongly stating the restrictive view in a noncompeting 
goods case). For examples of other trademark decisions authored by Judge Hand and joined by Judge 
Frank, see Artype, Inc. v. Zappulla, 228 F.2d 695 (2d Cir. 1956) (reversing a judgment for the defendant 
and holding that the plaintiff’s mark was not descriptive and that the plaintiff was entitled to some 
relief); Am. Auto. Ass’n v. Spiegel, 205 F.2d 771 (2d Cir. 1953) (reversing summary judgment 
enjoining use of the AAA mark); Adolph Kastor & Bros. v. FTC, 138 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1943) 
(affirming an FTC order enjoining use of “Scout” on knives as likely to be confused with Boy Scouts of 
America and seemingly taking a broader view of reputation harm in the absence of lost sales); and Pure 
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eloquently in several notable dissents.108 Perhaps because they were 
dissents, he wrote at some length, offering rather expansive, even 
philosophical, discussions of the issues and stating his position in a sharper 
tone than Judge Hand ever used. 
Frank’s approach rested on two fundamental propositions. First, he 
insisted that the paramount purpose of unfair competition law was to 
promote consumer welfare.109 Accordingly, he objected to expansions of 
trade-name monopolies that served seller interests at the expense of 
consumers.110 Second, he rejected any notion that free riding on goodwill 
was wrong in itself. In Frank’s view, a moral aversion to free riding 
stemmed from an excessively formalistic conception of “property” rights in 
a mark.111 When stripped of the formalistic property label, legal rights in 
trade names had weak support on policy grounds. For this reason, Frank 
believed they should be carefully limited to prevent trade-name monopolies 
that hurt consumers.112 
Judge Frank treated the seller-harm requirement as a gatekeeping 
device. If a trademark owner could not make a strong showing of reputation 
injury or market foreclosure, the suit was probably anticompetitive and 
protecting the mark would likely confer market power to the detriment of 
consumers.113 On the other hand, even if a strong showing could be made, it 
 
Oil Co. v. Puritan Oil Co., 127 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1942) (construing interstate commerce for purposes of the 
1905 Trademark Act). 
108  See, e.g., Triangle Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969, 974–82 (2d Cir. 1948) (Frank, J., 
dissenting); LaTouraine Coffee Co. v. Lorraine Coffee Co., 157 F.2d 115, 119–25 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, 
J., dissenting). 
109  See, e.g., LaTouraine Coffee, 157 F.2d at 124 (Frank, J., dissenting) (“We have said that the 
paramount interest to be protected in these trade-name cases is the consumers’.”). 
110  See id.; Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34, 37–42 (2d Cir. 1945) (Frank, J., 
concurring). 
111  Triangle Publ’ns, 167 F.2d at 974, 978 (Frank, J., dissenting) (“Where . . . the probability of 
confusion of source is not otherwise proved . . . , the fact of a ‘free ride’ is immaterial.”). 
112  Id. at 980–81 & n.13 (“The failure to keep constantly in mind the divers policy considerations 
which, in this legal province, come in conflict with one another and the consequent occasional over-
emphasis on but one of them—the protection of the interest of the businessman who has built a business 
around a name—has sometimes led to decisions unduly extending the confines of name-monopolies.” 
(quoting E. Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren, Ltd., 137 F.2d 955, 959 (2d Cir. 1943) (Frank, J., majority 
opinion)) (internal quotation mark omitted)). 
113  See, e.g., Standard Brands, 151 F.2d at 43 (Frank, J. concurring). In Standard Brands Inc. v. 
Smidler, the plaintiff sold vegetable juices under the V-8 mark and the defendant sold dry vitamin 
tablets under the same mark. As it happened, the plaintiff also sold dry vitamin tablets in competition 
with the defendant, but under a different mark, STAM. Id. at 35–36 (majority opinion). The majority 
(Judges Chase and Clark) treated the case as an easy one for liability. See id. at 37. Judge Frank 
disagreed and wrote a concurring opinion to highlight how difficult the case actually was. In Judge 
Frank’s view, the fact that the plaintiff already sold STAM vitamin tablets suggested that its “real 
purpose” in bringing suit was not to protect its V-8 mark, but rather to gain a competitive advantage in 
the vitamin tablet market, where the plaintiff and defendant were competitors. Id. at 43 (Frank, J., 
concurring). Furthermore, the plaintiff “manifested no intention of ever” using its trademark in the 
defendant’s market because it already used a different mark for vitamin tablets. Id. Finally, the 
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did not necessarily mean that consumer interests were being served. In 
theory at least, Frank was still prepared to examine the facts of the case to 
determine whether consumers were actually benefiting from the defendant’s 
use even if the trademark owner suffered some harm.114 
Judge Hand was not as clear as Judge Frank in endorsing the position 
that trademark law should focus exclusively on consumer interests, and his 
views on the purpose of requiring seller harm were less clearly articulated. 
But there is no question that Hand put a great deal of weight on consumer 
interests, and it is reasonable to read him as accepting the gatekeeping 
model as well. For both Frank and Hand, a strict rule requiring seller harm 
helped to screen out anticompetitive suits where the monopoly costs were 
likely to exceed any trademark benefits. 
A good example of Judge Frank’s restrictive approach to product 
market expansion can be found in his dissent in Triangle Publications, Inc. 
v. Rohrlich.115 The plaintiff published Seventeen, a fashion magazine for 
teenage girls; the defendant sold MISS SEVENTEEN girdles.116 Seventeen 
had developed such popularity that any item advertised or editorialized in 
the magazine and any item bearing its name “had an added desirability.”117 
As a result, the mark had promotional value, and the plaintiff sought to 
exploit as much of that value as possible. The district judge entered a 
permanent injunction, and the defendant appealed.118 
The appeal was heard by Judges Augustus N. Hand (not Learned 
Hand), Charles Clark, and Jerome Frank. Augustus Hand and Charles Clark 
affirmed. They held that the defendant’s use was likely to create confusion 
as to sponsorship of the defendant’s girdles even if there was no confusion 
as to source.119 Judge Frank wrote a scathing dissent.120 He saw no risk of 
 
plaintiff’s reputation was not obviously at risk because there was no evidence that the defendant’s 
vitamin tablets were “shoddy or substandard.” Id. Although Judge Frank went along with the majority in 
this case, he intimated that in future cases he would demand a strong showing of harm to the trademark 
owner: either actual intent to enter the defendant’s market or proof that the defendant’s product is of 
such low quality as to tarnish the trademark owner’s reputation. Id. 
114  Judge Frank was fond of giving as an example a case where the plaintiff sells a simple product, 
such as a bar of soap, and the defendant sells the identical product under the same mark at a lower price. 
See, e.g., id. at 40–41. This is a core competing products case, and it was settled law that the trademark 
owner could assert the injury of trade diversion to justify suit. Judge Frank, however, thought the law 
was misguided. In his view, only the soap-seller trademark owner suffers a loss, and consumers actually 
benefit from buying the lower priced product. See id. 
115  167 F.2d at 974 (Frank, J., dissenting). 
116  Id. at 970 (majority opinion). 
117  Id. at 971. 
118  Id. 
119  Id. at 972–73. 
120  Judge Frank first classified SEVENTEEN as a descriptive mark and thus a trade name subject to 
the restrictive approach. Id. at 974–75 (Frank, J., dissenting). The majority, on the other hand, had 
classified the mark as fanciful or arbitrary—based, in Judge Frank’s view, on a sloppy review of the 
evidence. Id. This was not the first time Judge Frank objected to the majority’s classification of a mark. 
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source confusion.121 Nor was there any possibility that the magazine 
publisher would enter the girdle market or any evidence that the defendant’s 
girdles were poor quality or otherwise a threat to the plaintiff’s reputation.122 
To be sure, the defendant was free riding on the popularity of the plaintiff’s 
mark, but in Frank’s view, “the fact of a ‘free ride’ is immaterial. . . .[A] 
‘free ride,’ without more, is in line with the theory of competition.”123 
More generally, Judge Frank reiterated his view that “[w]ithout doubt, 
the judge-made trade-name doctrine or concept fosters monopolies.”124 
Because of this, he believed it was important not to apply a trade-name rule 
mechanically, but to “peer behind” it “to observe the policy it embodies.”125 
And this was especially important in a case like Triangle Publications, 
which stretched existing law to “yield socially disvaluable results.”126 
b. Judge Charles Clark.—Judge Charles Clark stood firmly 
against Hand and Frank’s restrictive approach. Judge Clark believed that a 
risk of confusion alone should be enough for infringement without any 
regard to harm.127 He relied mainly on the text of the Lanham Trade-Mark 
Act of 1946 (Lanham Act),128 the federal statute that created a 
comprehensive scheme of trademark protection and expanded benefits for 
registered marks and federal protection for unregistered marks.129 However, 
 
See LaTouraine Coffee Co., Inc. v. Lorraine Coffee Co., 157 F.2d 115, 119–21 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J., 
dissenting). Judge Frank had to be particularly careful with this threshold issue because the restrictive 
rules applied only to descriptive and other trade name marks. See supra text accompanying note 98. 
121  See Triangle Publ’ns, 167 F.2d at 976–77, 981–82 (Frank, J., dissenting). In an interesting 
passage, Judge Frank criticized the majority for speculating about teenage girls’ reactions without any 
empirical evidence or personal experience. See id. at 976. 
122  Id. at 981 (“[A] plaintiff seeking . . . protection should always be required to prove that 
defendant’s product is so substandard that, if that product be associated by consumers with plaintiff, 
impairment of plaintiff’s good-will is a likely result.”). 
123  Id. at 978. 
124  Id. at 982 (“Such a concept should be carefully scrutinized when the courts are asked to widen it, 
as here, by a decision which will become a precedent with ‘radiating potencies.’”). 
125  Id. 
126  Id. 
127  See, e.g., Hyde Park Clothes, Inc. v. Hyde Park Fashions, Inc., 204 F.2d 223, 226, 228–29 (2d 
Cir. 1953) (Clark, J., dissenting) (“For the single question here seems to me to come down simply to 
this: Does the defendant’s use of the name confusingly mislead purchasers as to the source of the 
goods?”). 
128  See, e.g., id. at 227–28 (citing Lanham Trade-Mark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 
1125(a)). 
129  See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 5:4. The Lanham Act replaced the Trademark Act of 1905, 
which was considered inadequate by the 1930s and was heavily criticized. See id.; see also 
Bartholomew Diggins, The Lanham Trade-Mark Act, 35 GEO. L.J. 147, 148 (1947) (“The Act of 1905 
offered little in the way of protection for substantive rights and there was no great incentive to register 
trade-marks.”). 
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his interpretation of the Lanham Act was influenced by values that differed 
substantially from those that Hand and Frank held.130 
Judge Clark took the position that the Lanham Act eliminated the 
common law rule requiring harm in noncompeting products cases.131 His 
argument focused mainly on the language of the statutory infringement 
provision, § 1114.132 In  Clark’s view, the fact that § 1114 referred only to 
“confusion,” “mistake,” and “deception” suggested that Congress meant to 
impose liability for confusion alone without the harm-based restrictions that 
had been imposed previously.133  
Judge Hand saw matters differently.134 He argued that Congress meant 
only to update federal law to match the common law as it existed in 1946.135 
Because in Hand’s view the 1946 common law included the harm 
requirement, the Lanham Act had to be interpreted to include it as well. 
These divergent interpretations reflected a deeper division between 
Judges Hand and Clark at the level of trademark policy. Judge Hand’s 
concern about trade-name monopolies animated his construction of the 
Lanham Act. He counseled against construing the statute to eliminate a rule 
 
130  In Hyde Park Clothes, Inc. v. Hyde Park Fashions, Inc., Judge Clark denied that he had any 
“particular bias” in the matter. 204 F.2d at 228 (Clark, J., dissenting). And in the earlier Johnson II case, 
he actually claimed to be sympathetic to Judge Hand’s concerns about a trade-name owner’s “power to 
preempt new markets,” even referring to the concern as “compelling.” 175 F.2d 176, 179, 182–83 (2d 
Cir. 1949) (Clark, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, it is clear that Judge Clark’s interpretation of the Act was 
influenced by a rather different view of the policies at stake. For example, in both cases, Clark invoked 
an anti-free-riding policy. See Hyde Park Clothes, 204 F.2d at 228 (Clark, J., dissenting); Johnson II, 
175 F.2d at 182–83 (Clark, J., dissenting). As we have seen, Judge Frank rejected the anti-free-riding 
policy categorically and Judge Hand gave it little weight in noncompeting products cases. See supra Part 
II.B.1.a. 
131  See, e.g., Hyde Park Clothes, 204 F.2d at 226, 228–29 (Clark, J., dissenting) (discussing the 
impact of the enactment of the Lanham Act); Johnson II, 175 F.2d at 181–82 (Clark, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing Judge Hand’s interpretation of the Lanham Act). 
132  The version of § 1114(1) enacted in 1946 imposed liability when any person used “any 
reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of any registered mark . . .  [so that] such use is 
likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers as to the source or origin of [the 
associated] goods or services.” 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1946); see also Diggins, supra note 129, at 190 
(quoting the original 1946 version of § 1114(1)). 
133  See Hyde Park Clothes, 204 F.2d at 227 (Clark, J., dissenting) (citing § 1114(1) and noting that 
“[w]e have already given effect to the announced purpose of Congress to establish a national law in the 
Lanham Act so far as concerns the issue of infringement”); id. at 228 (“I felt and still feel that we should 
accept the congressional mandates on the whole rather gratefully.”); Johnson II, 175 F.2d at 181–82 
(Clark, J., dissenting) (eschewing a “definitive interpretation” of the Lanham Act, but still noting that a 
literal reading of § 1114(1) would “grant recovery wherever a mark is ‘intended to be used to cause 
confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers,’” and rejecting Judge Hand’s arguments against this 
interpretation). 
134  See, e.g., Johnson II, 175 F.2d at 178–80 (majority opinion) (“[I]t is far from true that the mere 
fact of confusion between the two users should always and of itself tip the scales in favor of the first.”). 
135  Id. at 178–79. 
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that had proved useful in controlling monopoly power.136 Judge Clark had a 
different view of the costs and benefits. He was not as concerned about the 
anticompetitive dangers of trade-name monopolies. He found it hard to 
believe that giving exclusive rights in a trade name could restrain 
competition given the large number of alternative words and symbols 
available to competitors.137 Clark also placed much more weight on the 
unfairness of someone free riding on a mark owner’s hard-earned 
goodwill.138 Moreover, whereas Hand and Frank saw consumer interests 
served by limits on monopolies, enhanced competition, and lower prices, 
Clark, in at least one case, equated consumer interests with a formal 
autonomy value.139 He argued, in effect, that confusion by itself harmed 
consumers even when they ended up with a high-quality product at a lower 
price.140 
2. 1953–1960: The Rift Repairs.—Thus, the law of the Second 
Circuit was in a muddle by the early 1950s. Judge Frank noted the 
developing inconsistency as early as 1948,141 and Judge Clark complained 
 
136  Id. at 179 (“[T]here is the strongest possible reason for not reading the language [of Section 
1114] literally, because to do so would frequently result in great hardship to others, and give to the first 
user of a mark a wholly unjustified power to preempt new markets.”); see also id. at 180 (“If Congress 
really meant to allow every first user of a mark so to stifle all excursions into adjacent markets upon 
showing no more than that confusion would result, it seems to us that it would have said so more 
clearly.”). 
137  See Best & Co. v. Miller, 167 F.2d 374, 378 (2d Cir. 1948) (Clark, J., dissenting) (“Moreover, it 
seems obvious that in the case of a trade name there is nothing like the same opportunity for burdensome 
monopoly and restriction on scientific advances which experience has shown to exist in the grant of a 
patent. The resources of the English language are such that a defendant may be required without undue 
hardship to choose his own formula or slogan to exploit without riding upon the successful advertising 
of another.”). 
138  See Hyde Park Clothes, 204 F.2d at 228–29 (Clark, J., dissenting) (claiming “equal repugnance 
for the excesses of American advertising as for the attempts at a ‘free ride’ upon a business reputation 
built up by others”); LaTouraine Coffee Co. v. Lorraine Coffee Co., 157 F.2d 115, 119 (2d Cir. 1946) 
(stating that “one cannot ride upon another’s coattails in the inevitable process of becoming bigger”); id. 
at 118 (noting that a firm that invests in building the “drawing power” of its mark “can obtain redress if 
another poaches upon the commercial magnetism of the symbol he has created” (quoting Mishawaka 
Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Johnson II, 175 F.2d at 182–83 (Clark, J., dissenting) (noting that “[t]he question is insistently 
asked [by many] why . . . it is necessary to permit another to reap the rewards of the diligence and 
money expended by the original exploiter”). 
139  Hyde Park Clothes, 204 F.2d at 228 (Clark, J., dissenting) (quoting the first entry in the Lanham 
Act’s statement of “Basic Purposes” to the effect that the public should be able to rely on trademarks to 
get what it “asks for and wants to get”). 
140  Id. (“I think it important that women, when being led to buy the somewhat lower priced goods of 
defendant, should not be also led to think that they are getting goods backed up with the plaintiff’s long 
established reputation in the garment industry.”). But see Johnson II, 175 F.2d at 180–81 (Clark, J., 
dissenting) (suggesting that consumer interests were subordinated in the passage of the Lanham Act). 
141  See Triangle Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969, 981 (2d Cir. 1948) (Frank, J., dissenting) 
(referring to a Second Circuit case decided just one month earlier and warning that “anyone reading the 
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in 1953 that decisions varied by “the chance of the assignment calendar.”142 
During this period, the court divided into two camps and the decisions split 
accordingly. Judges Chase and Augustus Hand usually aligned with Judge 
Clark and the liberal infringement approach, while Judge Swan tended to 
join with Judges Learned Hand and Jerome Frank in applying the more 
restrictive approach.143 Moreover, the doctrinal muddle reflected a deeper 
normative divide.144 
However, during the latter half of the 1950s, Second Circuit doctrine 
began to settle gradually in favor of Judge Clark’s confusion-only approach. 
The precise reasons for the change are not clear, but there are some likely 
contributing causes. One is the changing composition of the court. By 1954, 
all of the permanent judges who shaped the law during the 1940s had taken 
senior status except Clark and Frank. When Judge Frank died in 1957, 
Judge Clark was the only remaining active judge with a personal stake in 
the Second Circuit’s earlier trademark jurisprudence.145 This turnover may 
 
decision in [that] case and the decision here will be in considerable confusion about the doctrine of 
confusion in this circuit”). 
142  Hyde Park Clothes, 204 F.2d at 226 (Clark, J., dissenting) (“Plaintiff-appellant has had the 
misfortune—so it seems to me—to come before a panel of this court allergic to the doctrine . . . of 
protecting trade names against competition which will create confusion as to the source of goods sold 
under such names.”). It is worth noting that in many of the trademark cases that involved confusion 
theories and that had Judge Frank and Judge Clark sitting on the same panel, one of the two judges was 
in the majority and the other was in dissent. See, e.g., id. at 224, 226 (considering noncompeting 
products with Judge Frank joining the majority opinion and Judge Clark dissenting); Triangle Publ’ns, 
167 F.2d at 970, 974 (considering noncompeting products with Judge Clark joining the majority opinion 
and Judge Frank dissenting); Best & Co., 167 F.2d at 375, 378 (considering competing products with 
Judge Frank joining the majority opinion and Judge Clark dissenting); LaTouraine Coffee Co., 157 F.2d 
at 116, 119 (considering competing products with Judge Clark writing the majority opinion and Judge 
Frank dissenting). Indeed, there was “incessant conflict” between Judges Clark and Frank and it was not 
limited to trademark law. MARVIN SCHICK, LEARNED HAND’S COURT 32 (1978). 
143  See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 24:56 (describing the two camps). For examples of cases 
where the liberal approach prevailed, see Admiral Corp. v. Penco, Inc., 203 F.2d 517 (2d Cir. 1953); 
Speed Prods. Co. v. Tinnerman Prods., Inc., 179 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1949); and Triangle Publ’ns, 
167 F.2d at 969 (over a Frank dissent). For cases where the more restrictive approach won the day, see 
Hyde Park Clothes, 204 F.2d at 223 (over a Clark dissent); Fed. Tel. & Radio Corp. v. Fed. Television 
Corp., 180 F.2d 250 (2d Cir. 1950); Johnson II, 175 F.2d at 176 (over a Clark dissent). The split also 
influenced some competing products cases. See, e.g., Best & Co., 167 F.2d at 374 (Frank and Swan with 
Clark dissenting); LaTouraine Coffee Co., 157 F.2d at 115 (Clark and Chase with Frank dissenting). 
144  See supra notes 136–40 and accompanying text. Judges Hand and Frank emphasized the dangers 
of monopoly, criticized the reliance on free-riding rationales, and valued the long-run consumer benefit 
from competition. Judge Clark, on the other hand, noted the unfairness of free riding, criticized 
exaggerated concerns about monopoly, and seemed to value formal consumer autonomy. 
145  Judge Learned Hand took senior status in 1951; Judge Swan, a strong supporter of Judges Hand 
and Clark, did so in 1953. MORRIS, supra note 85, at 130, 141. Judge Augustus Hand took senior status 
in 1953 and died in 1954. Id. at 142. Judge Chase also took senior status in 1954. Id. at 143. It is also 
notable that many of their replacements had relatively short tenures. For example, Judge Medina, who 
replaced Judge Learned Hand, was forced into semi-retirement after approximately seven years, in 1958 
(Judge Henry Friendly took his spot). Similarly, Judge Swan’s replacement assumed senior status after 
only about five years, in 1959. Finally, Judge Augustus Hand’s replacement, John Marshall Harlan, 
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well have given Clark considerable power on the court, perhaps reinforced 
by his serving as Chief Justice from 1954 to 1958. 
Whatever the reason, Judge Clark’s approach became the focus of 
infringement analysis during the 1950s. Moreover, Clark elevated the 
importance of the Restatement’s multifactor likelihood of confusion test. 
During the 1940s and early 1950s, the Restatement was seldom cited, and 
the court never invoked the Restatement factors in a systematic way. 
However, Judge Clark endorsed the Restatement’s test in his Hyde Park 
Clothes dissent and even suggested that the Restatement might be relevant 
to construing the Lanham Act itself.146 As we shall see in Part II.C, the 
Restatement factors played an important role in the Second Circuit’s formal 
adoption of the first multifactor likelihood of confusion test in 1961. 
Still, it is important not to overstate the trend of the case law between 
1953 and 1960. Few trademark cases during this period involved 
noncompeting products. Moreover, in one case, decided in 1960, the court 
seemed to breathe new life into the Hand–Frank restrictive approach, 
although perhaps only for determining the scope of relief rather than for 
finding infringement.147 In any event, the conflicting precedent from the 
1940s and early 1950s was too powerful to ignore and continued to haunt 
Second Circuit trademark jurisprudence until Judge Friendly worked legal 
magic. 
C. 1961–1962: The Likelihood of Confusion Test Emerges 
Judge Friendly’s opinion in Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics 
Corp.148 launched the modern multifactor test for likelihood of confusion 
 
served only two years before being appointed to the United States Supreme Court. See id. at 173–74, 
177. 
146  204 F.2d at 228–29 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
147  Avon Shoe Co. v. David Crystal, Inc., 279 F.2d 607, 612–13 (2d Cir. 1960). The owner of the 
registered mark HAYMAKERS for men’s, women’s, and children’s shoes sued the seller of 
HAYMAKER stylish sportswear for women. Id. at 609. The court denied an injunction despite finding 
likely confusion. It reasoned that an injunction does not automatically issue against an innocent use on 
noncompeting products and that there was no significant reputation risk or likely entry in the case, the 
defendant’s mark was adopted in good faith, and the plaintiff delayed before bringing suit. Id. at 613–14. 
Judge Clark voted with the majority, which is strange given the court’s strong endorsement of the earlier 
Judge Hand opinions and the reputation injury and market foreclosure requirements. Id. (approving the 
old limiting principles as “well beyond judicial reconsideration at this late date”). Judge Clark’s vote is 
less puzzling if one assumes he understood the decision as about remedy rather than liability. He had no 
problem with counting reputation and market foreclosure harms as part of a traditional balance of 
equities for injunctive relief. See, e.g., Johnson II, 175 F.2d at 181 (Clark, J., dissenting) (suggesting that 
the competing equities might be better worked out by adjusting the remedy than by denying liability on 
the basis of remote trademark owner injury). 
148  287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961). The plaintiff owned the registered mark POLAROID and sold a 
variety of optical and photography products, including some involving television uses. The defendant 
used the mark POLARAD to sell microwave devices and television studio equipment. Id. at 493–94. 
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and influenced the adoption of similar tests in other circuits.149 Judge 
Friendly’s analysis is a tour de force. He replaced the conflicting Second 
Circuit precedent with a single infringement test and relied in part on 
sections 729 and 731 of the Restatement for authority.150 The resulting 
multifactor test diluted the Hand–Frank injury requirements by converting 
them from threshold requirements into mere factors in an eight-factor 
balancing test aimed at estimating the likelihood of confusion. Friendly’s 
test instantiated Clark’s confusion-only approach, but did so without 
offering any policy reason for focusing exclusively on confusion and 
ignoring harm.151 Nevertheless, the test was flexible and open-ended enough 
to accommodate a range of views,152 and it ended up quieting, though not 
resolving, the tensions that had plagued the court’s trademark jurisprudence 
for almost twenty years. 
The Polaroid test included the following eight factors: 
the strength of [the plaintiff’s] mark, the degree of similarity between the two 
marks, the proximity of the products, the likelihood that the prior owner will 
bridge the gap, actual confusion, and the reciprocal of defendant’s good faith 
in adopting its own mark, the quality of defendant’s product, and the 
sophistication of the buyers.153 
Most important, the Hand–Frank requirement of reputation injury was 
reduced to “the quality of defendant’s product” and likely market entry 
became “the likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the gap.”154 In this 
way, what had been two gatekeeping requirements entitled to priority in the 
 
149  See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 24:32 (“The history and development of the test of 
infringement in the Second Circuit has been immensely influential in the development of United States 
law . . . .”); see also infra note 165 and accompanying text (illustrating that the Second Circuit’s 
multifactor test has influenced the tests adopted in other circuits). 
150  Polaroid, 287 F.2d at 495. 
151  See id. at 495–96 (making multiple references to the need to show likelihood of confusion in 
order to “bring into play . . . the Lanham Act” without explicitly mentioning any need to show 
reputation harm or product market expansion); see also supra Part II.B.1 (distinguishing Judge Clark’s 
expansive confusion-only approach from Judge Hand’s and Judge Frank’s more restrictive view). Of 
course, I cannot know what was really in Judge Friendly’s mind when he formulated the Polaroid test, 
and in particular whether he wanted to get rid of the Hand–Frank requirements. That is certainly the 
result of what he did, and I suspect he found that result congenial. 
152  See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 24:57 (“The Polaroid factors proved to be the pattern on 
which eventually all of the judges could acquiesce and construct their opinions.”). 
153  Polaroid, 287 F.2d at 495 (adding that the factors were not meant to be exclusive). Many of the 
Polaroid factors map into the Restatement factors. For example, the strength of the mark, similarity 
between the marks, and proximity of the products have (differently worded) analogues in the section 731 
factors. Further, the “reciprocal of defendant’s good faith” clearly refers to the Restatement’s intent 
factor, and buyer sophistication is the same as degree of purchaser care. Compare id. (listing the Second 
Circuit’s likelihood of confusion factors), with 3 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 731 & cmt. a (1938) (listing 
the Restatement’s nine factors, “which are generally important” but not necessarily “exclusive”). 
154  Polaroid, 287 F.2d at 495; see also supra Part II.B.1.a (presenting Judge Hand’s and Judge 
Frank’s restrictive approach to infringement). 
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analysis were transformed into two factors that could be outweighed by 
other factors or even ignored completely, all with the goal of determining 
whether confusion was likely without regard to seller or consumer harm.155 
The Polaroid case itself is a good example of how the multifactor test 
can subordinate the Hand–Frank injury requirements. Although the case 
was ultimately decided on laches grounds, the court briefly discussed how 
its new multifactor test might apply to the facts. Concluding that the 
plaintiff might have been “entitled to at least some injunctive relief if it had 
moved with reasonable promptness,” the court emphasized the strength of 
the plaintiff’s mark, the similarity of the marks, and the proximity of the 
party’s television-related products.156 Remarkably, it ignored the two 
factors—product quality and bridge the gap—that embodied the Hand–
Frank injury requirements. This is especially striking because the defendant 
emphasized that its products were high quality and that the likelihood of 
plaintiff’s entry was slim.157 The court did not dispute either point but chose 
to ignore both in its discussion of likely confusion.158 
Polaroid is best viewed as a transitional opinion, straddling both sides 
of the Second Circuit divide while trying to mask the conflict. It gives 
something to each side even as it sets the stage for a more definitive move 
to a multifactor, confusion-only test. That definitive move came one year 
later, in Triumph Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Triumph International Corp.159 
The Triumph Hosiery court opened its discussion with the telling 
observation that while “it is difficult to reconcile all the decisions of this 
court . . . , we think the full Bench of the court would now accept the 
propositions set forth in the opinion in [Polaroid].”160 It then proceeded to 
quote the Polaroid court’s statement of the multifactor test. Judge Hincks, 
 
155  It is more than a little ironic that the Polaroid court enlisted the original Restatement for a 
confusion-only approach to infringement when the comments to section 730 of the Restatement made 
clear that the only basis for recovery was reputation injury or market foreclosure. See supra notes 71–72 
and accompanying text; see also 3 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 730 cmt. b (1938) (“[T]he interest in a 
trade-mark or trade name is protected . . . only within the limits fixed by the likelihood of confusion . . . . 
The issue in each case is whether the [products] of the actor and of the other are sufficiently related so 
that the alleged infringement would subject the good-will and reputation of the other’s trade-mark or 
trade name to the hazards of the actor’s business.”); id. § 731 cmt. c (“Confusion and difficulty would be 
caused if normal expansion of a business were impeded by inability to expand correspondingly the 
scope of a trade-mark used in the business.”). 
156  Polaroid, 287 F.2d at 496. 
157  Id. at 495. 
158  To be sure, Judge Friendly judiciously quoted a passage from one of Judge Learned Hand’s 
opinions, in which Judge Hand states that a trademark owner has only its reputation and market-entry 
interests to protect in noncompeting-products cases. Id. at 497–98 (quoting Dwinell-Wright Co. v. White 
House Milk Co., 132 F.2d 822, 824–25 (2d Cir. 1943)). But that case involved a laches defense, and 
Judge Friendly quoted and cited it in Polaroid only to support the availability of laches for injunctive 
relief. Neither the case nor the quote is referred to at all in the infringement discussion. 
159  308 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1962). 
160  Id. at 198. 
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for the court, emphasized that likelihood of source confusion is the 
“touchstone” of infringement under the Lanham Act.161 Furthermore, he 
explained that Hand’s and Frank’s traditional reputation-injury and market-
foreclosure limitations were now merely factors in the multifactor test, 
entitled to no particular priority and subject to being outweighed by other 
factors: 
It will be observed that this broadly stated summary [of the multifactor test in 
Polaroid] includes the two conditions . . . which Judge L. Hand . . . thought 
should limit the extension of a trade-mark to cover related goods . . . . The 
Polaroid summary recognizes that the reach of the trade-mark beyond its 
owner’s present use depends upon factors which are variable and relative, none 
of which standing alone constitutes the sole criterion.162 
After Polaroid and Triumph Hosiery, judges in the Second Circuit 
gradually embraced the multifactor test.163 Moreover, judges elsewhere 
followed the Second Circuit’s lead and formulated their own multifactor 
likelihood of confusion tests.164 Although these tests differed somewhat in 
the factors they included, many of them were influenced by Polaroid, 
Triumph Hosiery, and other Second Circuit precedent.165 
 
161  Id. at 200. 
162  Id. at 198. The court also selectively and creatively interpreted Judge Hand’s opinions to support 
the Polaroid approach, even though none of those opinions actually offered any support. See id. at 198–
99. The court, for example, cited Hand’s endorsement of an equitable balance between the interests of 
the trademark owner and the interests of the defendant as support for Polaroid’s balancing test. Id. But 
Hand’s equitable balance had nothing to do with estimating the probability of confusion. It instead had 
to do with the normative basis for liability and the importance of gatekeeping requirements. 
163  See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 24:57 (noting that the Polaroid factors became the accepted 
mode of analysis in the Second Circuit). Second Circuit judges did not always apply the test in the same 
way. See id. § 24:58 (claiming that some judges turned back to the Hand–Frank restrictive view during 
the late 1970s and early 1980s). 
164  See id. §§ 24:30–:43 (describing the multifactor tests in each of the circuits). For many years, 
courts tended to apply a simpler version of the test to competing products cases. This simpler version 
focused mainly on the similarity of the two marks. If the marks were similar enough and the plaintiff’s 
and defendant’s products competed directly, a finding of likelihood of confusion usually followed. See, 
e.g., AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348 (9th Cir. 1979) (noting that when goods compete, 
“infringement usually will be found if the marks are sufficiently similar that confusion can be 
expected”). More recently, however, there has been a strong trend toward applying the full-blown 
likelihood of confusion test to competing as well as noncompeting products cases. See 4 MCCARTHY, 
supra note 15, § 24:22. 
165  In most circuits, there is a key opinion that establishes the multifactor test for that circuit, and the 
factors are often named after that opinion, as in the “Polaroid factors.” Many of these key opinions 
either cite Polaroid or Triumph Hosiery (or both), or cite to cases that in turn trace back through 
successive citations to Second Circuit precedent. See, e.g., Interspace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 
462–63 (3d Cir. 1983) (citing two Second Circuit opinions, including Polaroid); Frisch’s Rests., Inc. v. 
Elby’s Big Boy, Inc., 670 F.2d 642, 648 (6th Cir. 1982) (citing Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 341, which cites 
Triumph Hosiery and the Restatement); Pignons S. A. de Mecanique de Precision v. Polaroid Corp., 657 
F.2d 482, 487 (1st Cir. 1981) (citing Alpha Indus., Inc. v. Alpha Steel Tube & Shapes, Inc., 616 F.2d 
440, 443 (9th Cir. 1980), which relies on Sleekcraft, which in turn relies on Triumph Hosiery); SquirtCo 
v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 1980) (citing Second Circuit precedent that traces all the 
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D. The Lessons of History 
The history of the multifactor test helps explain many of the 
deficiencies described more fully in Part III below. For example, the 
internal incoherence of the test results from the fact that it combines factors 
that served different functions historically. Similarity of the marks, 
proximity of the products, actual confusion, and buyer sophistication have 
always been relevant to estimating the probability of confusion.166 However, 
the likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the gap and the quality of the 
defendant’s product served a different function historically, a function tied 
to Judge Hand’s and Judge Frank’s restrictive approach and not to Judge 
Clark’s confusion-only approach. Bridge the gap and comparative quality 
were gatekeeping requirements that guarded against anticompetitive 
trademark suits. 
Moreover, the test’s genesis as an ad hoc compromise without a 
guiding policy rationale contributes to its vague and open-ended character. 
Also, focusing on consumer confusion alone naturally leads to conceiving 
the ultimate goal of trademark law as preventing any type of confusion, 
including confusion after sale and before sale, which pushes the law in 
problematic directions. And armed with a confusion-only infringement 
analysis and a vague and open-ended test, judges have wide latitude to 
impose liability on questionable grounds—such as anti-free riding—as long 
as they can find a plausible confusion risk. 
Perhaps the most important lesson of this history has to do with the 
role of harm in the infringement analysis. From the mid-1930s to the mid-
1950s, infringement doctrine developed with explicit attention to the harms 
and benefits of trademark protection. Judges Hand and Frank were attentive 
to monopoly costs and resistant to basing liability on an anti-free-riding 
principle.167 On the other hand, Judge Clark relied on an aversion to free 
riding and on at least one occasion invoked a strong consumer autonomy 
value to add support to his construction of the Lanham Act.168 However, 
when the Second Circuit instantiated the confusion-only analysis in 
Polaroid and Triumph Hosiery, it simply cited the Lanham Act and the 
Restatement without giving any clear policy reason for its new multifactor 
 
way back to Polaroid, Triumph Hosiery, and Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 
F.2d 538, 543 (2d Cir. 1956)); Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d at 348 n.11 (citing Triumph Hosiery and the 
Restatement); see also Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 711 F.2d 934, 940 (10th Cir. 1983) 
(citing Sleekcraft and Polaroid as well as other cases); Malarkey-Taylor Assocs., Inc. v. Cellular 
Telecomms. Indus. Ass’n, 929 F. Supp. 473, 477 (D.D.C. 1996) (citing Polaroid for the factors); Dow 
Corning Corp. v. Applied Power Indus., Inc., 322 F. Supp. 943, 946 (N.D. Ill. 1970) (citing Polaroid for 
confusion factors); La Maur, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co., No. 4-70-Civ. 442, 179 U.S.P.Q. 607, 609 n.1 
(D. Minn. June 18, 1973) (quoting Polaroid for the factors and describing them as “the rationale which 
the Second Circuit arrived at after years of debate”). 
166  See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
167  See supra Part II.B.1.a. 
168  See supra Part II.B.1.b. 
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approach.169 Detached from a convincing normative rationale, the likelihood 
of confusion test can do great mischief. And it has, as Part III explains. 
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION TEST 
The general multifactor likelihood of confusion test that all the circuits 
follow in one form or another is flawed along three dimensions.170 First, it 
produces bad results. Second, it is doctrinally incoherent. Third, it is 
inadequately supported on normative grounds. The following discussion 
explains each of these flaws in turn. 
A. Bad Results 
The likelihood of confusion test produces bad results in at least two 
ways. The open-ended nature of the test creates legal uncertainty and 
generates high litigation costs, which invite frivolous and weak assertions 
of trademark rights and chill socially valuable uses. Moreover, without a 
clear supporting rationale to limit its scope, the test is susceptible to broad 
interpretations that can generate high social costs. 
1. Chilling Effects.—Trademark owners often send cease-and-desist 
letters to alleged infringers, and when a legitimate user capitulates, the 
trademark owner succeeds in impermissibly extending its rights.171 The 
open-ended likelihood of confusion test facilitates this practice. Trademark 
owners would have little leverage if legitimate users could predict litigation 
success with confidence and obtain decisions early and at minimal cost. In 
that case, the user could simply ignore the letter and call the trademark 
owner’s bluff. However, the vague and open-ended nature of the likelihood 
of confusion test makes success hard to predict even for legitimate users, 
and the dependence of the test on case-specific facts makes litigation 
costly.172 
The combination of uncertainty and high litigation costs creates an 
environment conducive to frivolous and weak assertions of trademark 
rights.173 In this environment, a legitimate user might well agree to a pro-
plaintiff settlement, especially if the user is risk averse and less financially 
secure than the trademark owner. As a result, trademark owners can 
 
169  See supra Part II.C. 
170  Unless otherwise stated, references to the “likelihood of confusion test” in the rest of this Article 
refer to the general balancing test that incorporates a number of factors aimed at predicting likely 
confusion and not to any particular circuit’s embodiment of that test. 
171  See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 5, at 416–18 & n.13, 420; McGeveran, supra note 3, at 63–
66. 
172  See, e.g., Lemley & McKenna, supra note 5, at 420 (noting that many recipients of cease and 
desist letters capitulate without litigation “rather than face the uncertainty of a lawsuit”); McGeveran, 
supra note 3, at 64–71 (describing these dynamics). 
173  For a discussion of incentives to file frivolous and weak suits in general, see Robert G. Bone, 
Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519 (1997). 
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succeed in shutting down expressive and other socially valuable uses 
simply by threatening suit.174 
2. Broad Interpretations.—Over the past thirty years or so, courts 
have given the likelihood of confusion test very broad interpretations that 
risk high social costs without clear trademark-related benefits. Two 
examples are noteworthy: expansions in the meaning of intent and 
expansions in the types of actionable confusion. 
First, consider the intent factor, which is included in all but one of the 
circuits’ likelihood of confusion tests.175 This factor focuses on whether the 
defendant adopted the mark in bad faith, and it weighs very strongly in 
favor of likely confusion when it applies.176 In the nineteenth century, the 
relevant intent was limited to subjective intent to deceive,177 but over time it 
has been construed much more broadly. Intent to deceive can now be 
inferred merely from the defendant’s adoption of a similar mark with 
knowledge of the plaintiff’s prior use.178 Furthermore, the relevant types of 
intent reach beyond deception. Some courts are willing to find bad faith 
intent when the defendant aims only to copy the plaintiff’s mark or to free 
ride on the plaintiff’s goodwill without intending to deceive.179 
These expansions in the meaning of intent create a greater risk that 
some socially desirable trademark uses will be deterred.180 For example, a 
defendant might copy an aesthetically attractive product feature that the 
plaintiff claims as its mark in order to capture the feature’s aesthetic value 
without meaning to confuse or deceive consumers. When a court finds bad 
 
174  Although I am not aware of any empirical studies quantifying the magnitude of this problem, it 
is worth noting that there is sufficient concern that a website has been created just to deal with the 
chilling effects of cease and desist letters. See Chilling Effects, CHILLING EFFECTS CLEARINGHOUSE, 
http://chillingeffects.org (last visited Aug. 11, 2012). 
175  Only the Federal Circuit does not include bad faith intent as an explicit factor. See 
4 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, §§ 24:29–:43; Beebe, supra note 1, at 1589–90. 
176  Beebe, supra note 1, at 1628 (“[A] finding of bad faith intent creates, if not in doctrine, then at 
least in practice, a nearly un-rebuttable presumption of a likelihood of confusion.”). 
177  See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 23:113. 
178  See id. § 23:115; Beebe, supra note 1, at 1630 (noting that “this circumstantial inference is the 
leading basis for a finding of bad faith intent” today). 
179  See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Keystone Auto. Indus., Inc., 453 F.3d 351, 354, 357 & n.1 (6th 
Cir. 2006) (considering the “defendant’s intent in selecting the mark” as one of the likelihood of 
confusion factors and counting in favor of liability the fact that the defendant copied the design of the 
plaintiff’s grilles without requiring any direct evidence of intent to deceive); Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio v. 
Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1242–43 (6th Cir. 1991) (focusing on the defendant’s intent to capitalize on the 
plaintiff’s goodwill and reputation); Perfect Fit Indus., Inc. v. Acme Quilting Co., 618 F.2d 950, 954 (2d 
Cir. 1980) (“If there was intentional copying the second comer will be presumed to have intended to 
create a confusing similarity of appearance and will be presumed to have succeeded.”). 
180  Professor McCarthy, in his treatise, cautions against equating intent to confuse with intent to 
copy. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 23:113. The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition 
includes a similar warning. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 22(2) & cmt. c 
(1995). 
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faith intent on the basis of this copying and then infers likely confusion, it 
risks giving trademark owners the power to impede healthy competition in 
the product market.181 
Judicial recognition of broader types of actionable confusion is another 
example of problematic expansion in the scope of the likelihood of 
confusion test. The Lanham Act does not define “confusion,” and the 
likelihood of confusion test itself does nothing to clarify the meaning of the 
term. Nor do any of the various formulations of the test include an account 
of why confusion is harmful. The likelihood of confusion test merely 
instructs courts to determine whether “confusion” is likely. Many judges 
have followed this instruction quite literally by broadly giving credit to any 
possible way that consumers might be confused.182 
For example, actionable confusion now includes confusion not only 
about whether the plaintiff is selling the defendant’s product but also about 
whether the plaintiff has licensed use of its mark. Thus, Anheuser-Busch, 
the beer brewing company that owns the registered MICHELOB trademark, 
managed to obtain an injunction against a humor magazine to stop a parody 
ad for “Michelob Oily.”183 The court’s rationale was not that readers might 
believe Anheuser-Busch sold “Michelob Oily” beer or was involved with 
the (fictional) company that did, but rather that they might think Michelob 
authorized the use of its mark in the parody.184 
 
181  It is true that the functionality doctrine is supposed to protect the defendant in circumstances like 
these, but the effectiveness of this doctrine is rather limited, especially as applied to aesthetic trade 
dress. As a result, inferring likely confusion from intent to copy sometimes gives the trademark owner a 
litigating advantage that he should not have. See Bone, supra note 13, at 2155–81. The reason has to do 
with the nature of the aesthetic functionality test. That test turns on whether protecting the aesthetic 
features in question would confer a “significant non-reputation-related disadvantage” on competitors, 
which in turn requires a factual inquiry into the availability of alternative, nonconfusing designs with 
similar aesthetic appeal. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 33 (2001) (“It is 
proper to inquire into a ‘significant non-reputation-related disadvantage’ in cases of esthetic 
functionality . . . .”). The test’s highly fact-specific inquiry into alternatives makes summary judgment 
difficult to obtain, which in turn makes it easier for plaintiffs to obtain favorable settlements in 
anticompetitive strike suits. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 213–14 
(2000) (referring to the risk of “anticompetitive strike suit[s]” and noting that “[c]onsumers should not 
be deprived of the benefits of competition with regard to the utilitarian and esthetic purposes that 
product design ordinarily serves by a rule of law that facilitates plausible threats of suit against new 
entrants . . . . It is true, of course, that the person seeking to exclude new entrants would have to 
establish the nonfunctionality of the design feature . . . . Competition is deterred, however, not merely by 
successful suit but by the plausible threat of successful suit . . . .”). 
182  See, e.g., Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 711 (3d Cir. 2004) (“The [Lanham] 
Act is now broad enough to cover ‘the use of trademarks which are likely to cause confusion, mistake, 
or deception of any kind, not merely of purchasers nor simply as to source of origin.’” (quoting Syntex 
Labs., Inc. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 437 F.2d 566, 568 (2d Cir.1971) (emphasis added))). See 
generally Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 295 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(arguing that the 1962 amendment to § 1114 of the Lanham Act authorized judicial expansions to 
include initial interest confusion). 
183  Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 771–72, 777–78 (8th Cir. 1994). 
184  Id. at 775. 
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Moreover, trademark owners can enjoin uses that do not confuse 
buyers at the point of purchase. For example, Levi Strauss & Company 
(Levi) was able to use a post-sale confusion theory to stop Lois Sportswear, 
U.S.A. from selling designer jeans with a stitching pattern that looked like 
the famous Levi’s pattern.185 The court worried that third parties viewing 
purchased jeans worn in public might infer from the stitching pattern that 
they were Levi’s jeans. It did not matter to the court that the infringer sold 
“designer” jeans and that consumers might benefit from having this new 
product.186 
Also, in recent years, courts have used an initial-interest confusion 
theory to enjoin use of competitors’ marks to attract consumers to websites. 
For example, Brookfield Communications, an Internet provider of movie 
information, was able to stop West Coast Entertainment (West Coast), an 
Internet video rental and movie information supplier, from using 
Brookfield’s mark, MOVIEBUFF, as part of a website meta-tag.187 An 
Internet user inputting “moviebuff” into a search engine would pull up a list 
of sites that included Brookfield’s and West Coast’s domain names.188 
Although the user was not likely to be confused about any connection with 
Brookfield after visiting West Coast’s site, it was enough for the court that 
the user might click on West Coast’s site, mistakenly believing it to be 
related to Brookfield’s because it appeared in the same search results.189 
While these expansions have their supporters, critics blame them for 
many of the most problematic trademark decisions in recent years. For 
example, broad reliance on sponsorship confusion can prevent expressive 
uses of marks, such as the “Michelob Oily” parody.190 Post-sale confusion 
can be used to confer exclusivity over product features that have 
consumption value, such as Levi’s unique stitching pattern, and, as a result, 
can impede competition and discourage innovation.191 And initial-interest 
 
185  Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 868 (2d Cir. 1986); see also 
Bone, Hunting Goodwill, supra note 35, at 609–11 (discussing the case and noting that it revived the 
post-sale confusion theory). 
186  Lois Sportswear, 799 F.2d at 870–73. 
187  Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1041–42, 1066 (9th Cir. 
1999). 
188  Id. at 1042–45. 
189  Id. at 1062–66. But see Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 
1137, 1148–49 (9th Cir. 2011) (limiting Brookfield Commc’ns, 174 F.3d at 1036, mainly to domain 
name disputes). 
190  See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns., 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994); see also Mut. of 
Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 402 (8th Cir. 1987) (enjoining use of Mutual of Omaha’s 
marks in an antinuclear-proliferation message); Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. 
Supp. 2d 727, 728, 732 (D. Minn. 1998) (granting preliminary injunction against film company’s use of 
Dairy Queens as the title of a “mockumentary” about a Midwestern beauty pageant). 
191  See Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1986); see also, 
e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Keystone Auto. Indus., Inc., 453 F.3d 351, 356–59 (6th Cir. 2006) (using 
post-sale confusion theory to enjoin the sale of after-market replacement grilles for plaintiff’s 
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confusion can deter creative uses of the Internet that reduce consumer 
search costs and provide easy access to information about comparative 
quality and price.192 
B. Doctrinal Incoherence 
The bad results illustrated in Part III.A are in fact symptoms of 
problems internal to the likelihood of confusion test itself. One of these 
problems has to do with doctrinal incoherence. Most circuits consider 
factors that make little sense for a test that aims to measure probabilities 
and factors that, while relevant to estimating the probability of confusion, 
perform other functions that do not obviously fit a confusion analysis. The 
following discussion considers four of these problematic factors: (1) bridge 
the gap, (2) comparative product quality, (3) strength of the mark, and 
(4) defendant’s intent.193 
1. Bridge the Gap.—The bridge-the-gap factor refers to the 
possibility that the trademark owner might enter the defendant’s 
noncompeting product market and sell the same product as the defendant 
sells.194 As Part II.B.1.a showed, this factor started out as a gatekeeping 
requirement that focused on seller harm and required a showing of actual 
plans to enter the defendant’s market. In this form, bridge the gap had 
nothing at all to do with the probability of consumer confusion. After all, 
the plaintiff’s plans cannot possibly affect consumer perceptions when 
consumers know nothing about those plans. 
The incorporation of this factor into the test for predicting likely 
confusion has altered its meaning and greatly reduced its significance.195 
Many courts and commentators today treat it as calling not for a subjective 
inquiry into the plaintiff’s plans but rather for an objective inquiry into 
whether firms similar to the plaintiff have a tendency, in general, to enter 
product markets like the defendant’s.196 The idea is that if consumers 
 
automobiles); Reebok Int’l Ltd. v. Sung Hwa Int’l Corp., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1233 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (using 
post-sale confusion theory to issue a preliminary injunction against a sneaker producer’s use of the 
plaintiff’s “stripecheck” design). 
192  See Goldman, supra note 83. 
193  See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, §§ 24:29–:43; Beebe, supra note 1, at 1584. 
194  See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 24:18. 
195  It is significant, I believe, that despite playing a major role historically, today this factor appears 
in the tests of only five circuits, a result perhaps of its questionable relevance to likely confusion. See id. 
§§ 24:29–:43; Beebe, supra note 1, at 1584. 
196  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 21 cmt. j (1995) (noting that consumer 
perception is what really counts—not actual plans—because the test focuses on likely confusion, not 
harm); 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 24:19 (collecting cases that support the proposition that “[i]n 
determining possible expansion of a product line, it is the ordinary customer’s perception of possible 
expansion that counts, whether that perception comports with the reality of the senior user’s actual plans 
or not”); see also Lambda Elecs. Corp. v. Lambda Tech., Inc., 515 F. Supp. 915, 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) 
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believe that firms like the plaintiff’s usually sell products like the 
defendant’s, then they may conclude that the plaintiff itself is actually 
selling the defendant’s products or is at least involved with the defendant’s 
operation in some way. 
The problem is that the objective version of the bridge-the-gap factor 
collapses into another factor present in all the tests: proximity of the 
products.197 The proximity factor focuses on whether “the goods [of the 
plaintiff and the defendant] are similar enough that a customer would 
assume they were offered by the same source.”198 But this is exactly the 
same question that the objective version of the bridge-the-gap factor asks: 
Whether consumers would believe, based on the similarity of the products, 
that the plaintiff has actually entered the defendant’s market and is selling 
the defendant’s products or is involved with the defendant in some way. 
As a result, the bridge-the-gap factor has no independent role to play in 
the infringement analysis. It is either irrelevant to likely confusion or 
redundant of proximity. The empirical evidence confirms this conclusion. 
One study reveals that the bridge-the-gap factor has only a very weak effect 
on results.199 This is a remarkable fate for a factor that once had key 
importance as a gatekeeper. But it should not be surprising. The bridge-the-
gap factor fits awkwardly into a likelihood of confusion test that focuses 
exclusively on probabilities and ignores harm. 
2. Comparative Product Quality.—The comparative-quality factor 
has had a similar fate. This factor compares the quality of the defendant’s 
product with that of the plaintiff’s.200 Like bridge the gap, comparative 
quality played a central role as a gatekeeper in the mid-twentieth century: 
when the defendant’s product was lower quality compared to the plaintiff’s, 
the defendant’s use of a similar mark in a noncompeting market risked 
harming the plaintiff’s reputation. But as courts shifted away from harm 
and toward a confusion-focused test, the comparative-quality factor 
collapsed into the proximity-of-goods factor and lost its original 
significance. 
 
(noting the two distinct aspects of the bridge-the-gap factor: a defendant’s actual plans to enter and 
consumers’ perceptions that similar companies generally do expand). 
197  See Beebe, supra note 1, at 1591 (listing product proximity as a factor in the likelihood of 
confusion tests for all the circuits). 
198  Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 286 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(citing Wynn Oil Co. v. Thomas, 839 F.2d 1183, 1187 (6th Cir. 1988)); see 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 
15, § 24:19. 
199  See Beebe, supra note 1, at 1644 (noting that “courts either ignore . . . or bend” the bridge-the-
gap factor “to conform to the outcome of the test” dictated by other factors). 
200  See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 24:15. Only two circuits include comparative quality as an 
explicit factor in their formulations of the likelihood of confusion test. See id. §§ 24:29–:43; Beebe, 
supra note 1, at 1584. 
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It is easy to see why. When the focus is on probability of confusion, 
relative quality is relevant in an opposite way than when the focus is on 
harm. The inferior quality of an allegedly infringing product may reduce the 
likelihood of confusion by making the relevant products appear less similar 
so that consumers are less likely to believe the plaintiff is involved.201 In 
contrast, when the parties’ products are of comparable quality, they appear 
more similar so that consumers are more likely to be confused into thinking 
that the plaintiff is involved.202 Thus, when comparative quality is made part 
of the confusion-only test, it becomes redundant of the proximity-of-goods 
factor. Comparative quality affects the similarity of the products, which is 
exactly what the proximity factor is designed to measure. 
Like bridge the gap, comparative quality adds nothing to predicting 
likely confusion that other factors do not already supply. And once again, 
the empirical evidence confirms this conclusion.203 Indeed, one 
commentator has observed: 
Perhaps more than any other, the quality factor is an embarrassment to the 
multifactor test, and not simply because tarnishment should have no relevance 
to a finding of fact as to the likelihood of consumer confusion, nor because 
similarity in quality should already be addressed under the proximity factor, 
but because the factor is so utterly pliable.204 
This should not be surprising. Divorced from its original gatekeeping role, 
comparative quality has no obvious function to perform. 
3. Strength of the Mark.—The strength-of-the-mark factor focuses on 
the strength of the plaintiff’s mark, and as I explain below, strength depends 
on both inherent distinctiveness and secondary meaning.205 This factor 
started out, however, as a simple distinction between technical trademarks 
and trade names. As the history in Part II recounts, the Hand–Frank 
restrictive approach was limited to “trade names” (descriptive, geographic, 
and personal name marks requiring secondary meaning), and “technical 
trade-marks” (fanciful, arbitrary, and suggestive marks that were inherently 
distinctive) were given broader protection.206 When Judge Friendly 
 
201  See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 24:15 (noting that the “radically lower” quality of a junior 
user’s goods “might reduce the probability of confusion because buyers could be less likely to assume 
that a high quality producer would be responsible for the low quality goods or services of the junior 
user”). 
202  See, e.g., Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co., 117 F. Supp. 2d 360, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000) (noting that the similar quality of the parties’ product lines weighs in favor of infringement); see 
also Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 875 (2d Cir. 1986) (using the 
high quality of the defendant’s jeans as a reason supporting likely confusion). 
203  See Beebe, supra note 1, at 1644. 
204  Id. at 1644–45. 
205  See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 24:49 (“The more ‘famous’ and ‘well known’ a plaintiff’s 
mark, the greater the likelihood that use on noncompetitive products will cause confusion.”). 
206  See supra notes 90–96 and accompanying text. 
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formulated the first multifactor likelihood of confusion test in 1961, he 
transformed this precedent into the “strength of the mark” factor.207 Today, 
every circuit court considers this factor as part of the likelihood of 
confusion test, and the empirical evidence shows that it exerts a strong 
influence on results.208 
The problem is that mark strength has no obvious relationship to likely 
confusion. Courts measure the strength of a mark in two different ways: by 
whether the mark is inherently distinctive (called inherent or conceptual 
strength) and by how much secondary meaning it has (called acquired or 
market strength).209 For example, a court is likely to consider AFARION 
inherently strong for shampoo simply because it is fanciful. Moreover, the 
descriptive mark FISH-FRI for a batter mix used to fry fish will have more 
acquired strength the more secondary meaning it has. However, neither 
inherent strength nor acquired strength bears an obvious relationship to the 
likelihood that consumers will be confused. 
First, consider inherent strength. Assuming both marks have the same 
degree of secondary meaning, it is unclear why consumers should be more 
confused by seeing AFARION, a fanciful mark, on defendant’s shampoo 
than by seeing FISH-FRI, a descriptive mark, on a competing batter mix. In 
both cases, consumers, seeing the same mark on the defendant’s shampoo 
and associating it with the plaintiff, might assume that the plaintiff is the 
source of (or in some way connected with) the defendant’s shampoo. Why 
then should the intrinsic nature of the mark make a difference to the 
likelihood of confusion when each mark’s secondary meaning is the same? 
One might argue that consumers are more likely to remember a 
fanciful mark like AFARION than a descriptive mark like FISH-FRI. 
However, merely recalling a symbol is not enough to create likely 
confusion. For a court to find that consumers are confused about source or 
sponsorship, consumers must treat AFARION as a source-identifying mark 
for the plaintiff’s shampoo. Whether consumers actually do so is a matter of 
secondary meaning, not inherent distinctiveness. After all, if FISH-FRI has 
strong secondary meaning, consumers are likely to recall it even though it is 
a descriptive mark. Perhaps an unusual word like AFARION is more likely 
to capture consumer attention and distract consumers from contextual clues 
that mitigate confusion, but the same thing is true for descriptive marks like 
FISH-FRI that have strong secondary meaning. 
 
207  I say “transformed” because that is exactly what he did. As Part II explains, Judge Hand 
distinguished categorically between “technical trade-marks” and “trade names” because he believed the 
risk of monopoly costs was higher for the latter. “Strength of the mark,” on the other hand, is not a 
categorical distinction. Strength is treated as a continuous variable, and the strength of the mark factor 
has nothing to do with guarding against monopoly costs. 
208  Beebe, supra note 1, at 1612, 1620. 
209  See, e.g., Virgin Enters. Ltd. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 147 (2d Cir. 2003) (describing the 
concepts as “inherent distinctiveness” and “acquired distinctiveness,” respectively (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
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At least one court has tried to explain the relationship between inherent 
strength and likely confusion by relying on the relatively small probability 
that another firm would independently choose the same arbitrary or fanciful 
mark: “If a mark is arbitrary or fanciful,” the court reasoned, “consumers 
who see the mark on different objects offered in the marketplace will be 
likely to assume, because of the arbitrariness of the choice of mark, that 
they all come from the same source.”210 This argument has some force. It is 
possible that inherent distinctiveness could make a marginal difference to 
likely confusion when two marks—one inherently distinctive and the other 
descriptive—have the same degree of secondary meaning. But I, for one, 
am skeptical that the difference is large.211 My guess is that if mark strength 
has a significant impact on consumer confusion, it is because of acquired 
strength through secondary meaning, not because of inherent 
distinctiveness. And according to the empirical evidence, judges seem to 
agree.212 
Yet the relationship between acquired strength through secondary 
meaning and likely confusion is also uncertain. To see this point clearly, we 
must distinguish between two dimensions of secondary meaning. Secondary 
meaning is often used in a quantitative sense to refer to the proportion of 
consumers who use the mark as a source identifier. But it can also be used 
in a qualitative sense to refer to the commercial magnetism of a mark. A 
mark has stronger secondary meaning in the qualitative sense when the 
average consumer feels more strongly about the mark so that it has a more 
powerful grip on her purchasing decisions.213 
Turning first to secondary meaning in the quantitative sense, the 
relevance of this factor depends on what base population the likelihood of 
confusion test targets. If the base population consists only of consumers 
who are capable of being confused, secondary meaning in the quantitative 
sense has no relevance whatsoever to likely confusion. The probability that 
a source-identifying consumer will be confused depends on that consumer’s 
 
210  Id. at 148; see also id. (“For example, if consumers become familiar with a toothpaste sold under 
an unusual, arbitrary brand name, such as ZzaaqQ, and later see that same inherently distinctive brand 
name appearing on a different product, they are likely to assume, notwithstanding the product 
difference, that the second product comes from the same producer as the first. The more unusual, 
arbitrary, and fanciful a trade name, the more unlikely it is that two independent entities would have 
chosen it.”). 
211  And certainly not a large enough difference to warrant calling inherent strength the “most 
important” dimension of mark strength. Id. at 147 (“The strength of a trademark encompasses two 
different concepts . . . . The first and most important is inherent strength, also called ‘inherent 
distinctiveness.’”). 
212  See Beebe, supra note 1, at 1635–36 (noting that inherent distinctiveness has little independent 
effect on likelihood of confusion results). 
213  I refer to this aspect of secondary meaning as qualitative for obvious reasons. But it can be 
measured quantitatively by the size of the premium that consumers are willing to pay for the same 
product with the mark as compared to the product without it. 
106:1307  (2012) “Likelihood of Confusion” 
 1345
reaction to the mark and not in any way on how many other consumers 
happen to use the mark as a source identifier.214 
Secondary meaning in the quantitative sense is relevant, however, if 
the base population also includes those consumers who do not use the mark 
as a source identifier. Because non-source-identifying consumers cannot be 
confused, adding more of them to the mix reduces the likelihood that any 
randomly selected consumer from the base population will be confused.215 
The question then is which definition of the base population is the 
correct one for determining likely confusion. At first glance, the answer 
might seem obvious: because the only consumers who can possibly be 
confused are those who use the mark as a source identifier, they are the only 
ones relevant for estimating confusion risks.216 But the matter is a bit more 
complicated. One might reasonably argue that trademark law should not 
impose liability unless the number of potentially confused consumers is 
large enough, that is, unless it exceeds some threshold level. Perhaps the 
purpose of secondary meaning in the quantitative sense is to define this 
threshold.217 If this is correct, however, we would expect mark strength to 
play only a subordinate and relatively limited role in the likelihood of 
confusion analysis. Secondary meaning does not have to be terribly strong 
 
214  To see this point clearly, let p be the probability that any consumer will be confused, and let n be 
the total number of consumers. My point is that p is independent of and does not increase with n. On 
average, p × n consumers will be confused, but the likelihood of confusion for any consumer remains 
fixed at p. It is true that the probability that at least one consumer will be confused, which is 1 - (1 - p)n, 
does increase with n. But the likelihood of confusion test focuses on p. Indeed, if likelihood of confusion 
varied with n, even a tiny p would support liability for a large enough n, which is plainly an absurd 
result. 
215  To illustrate, assume that there is a 50% chance that a consumer capable of being confused will 
actually be confused. Also assume that the base population has 1000 consumers. Consider a scenario in 
which there are only 100 non-source-identifying consumers. In that case, 900 consumers (90%) will 
understand the mark to be a source identifier (i.e., secondary meaning in the quantitative sense is very 
strong), and 450 consumers (50% x 900 = 450) will actually be confused. Compare this to a scenario in 
which there are 950 non-source-identifying consumers. In this case, only 50 consumers (5%) will 
understand the mark to be a source identifier (i.e., secondary meaning in the quantitative sense is 
extremely weak), and only 25 consumers (50% x 50 = 25) will actually be confused. To generalize, let n 
be the total number of consumers, and let m be the number of consumers who understand the mark to be 
a source identifier for the plaintiff’s product. Let p be the probability that the defendant’s use will create 
confusion for a consumer who treats the mark as a source identifier. It follows that the probability that 
any consumer randomly selected from the total population of n consumers will be confused is p × m / n. 
This probability increases as m / n—the fraction of source-identifying consumers—increases. I am 
grateful to my colleague, Oren Bracha, for making this point clear to me. 
216  Let p be the probability of confusion for a consumer who is capable of being confused. The 
probability of confusion for a consumer incapable of being confused is 0 (zero). The question is why the 
likelihood of confusion test should depend on a weighted average of p and 0 rather than just on p alone. 
217  In fact, modern trademark law recognizes just this sort of threshold in the context of determining 
whether a descriptive mark is distinctive enough to warrant protection. For that purpose, secondary 
meaning exists only when a “significant,” “substantial,” or “appreciable” number of consumers use the 
mark as a source identifier. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 15:45. While judges resist using precise 
percentages, it appears as though the threshold requirement is relatively low. See id. 
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for there to be a substantial number of consumers at risk. As long as other 
factors support a substantial likelihood for source-identifying consumers, 
even a relatively weak secondary meaning should be sufficient. Indeed, a 
fraction as small as 5% can represent a very large number of potentially 
confused consumers when the base population is large enough. But 
assigning a minor role to mark strength is contrary to the evidence that 
indicates mark strength has a powerful influence on likelihood of confusion 
results.218 
It is also difficult to see how secondary meaning in the qualitative 
sense relates to likelihood of confusion. A mark with a more powerful grip 
on consumers might divert attention away from contextual clues that could 
mitigate confusion. But this is not likely to be a serious problem except for 
impulse purchases. When a consumer spends some time deliberating on a 
purchase, she is not likely to focus exclusively on the mark. She might do 
so at first, but she will soon take in the rest of the marketing context. 
This analysis does not rule out the possibility that mark strength 
matters for estimating likely confusion. But the relationship is not 
intuitively obvious. The question is in part an empirical one, and more 
evidence is needed. This is somewhat of a puzzle. How can it be that a 
factor with a questionable link to likelihood of confusion should play a 
prominent role in the likelihood of confusion test? As we have seen, mark 
strength entered the test to take account of the precedent limiting the 
restrictive approach to trade names. But why does it still have a strong 
influence now, after the restrictive approach has been eliminated? 
I believe the answer has to do with the work that mark strength does 
behind the scenes. Acquired strength is connected to another variable that 
should be relevant to infringement but is officially ignored by the likelihood 
of confusion test: the seriousness of the harm caused by confusion when it 
materializes.219 Stronger secondary meaning in the quantitative sense 
implies more consumers who use the mark as a source identifier and 
therefore more consumers who are likely to be confused. This in turn 
implies greater potential consumer harm. Also, a mark with stronger 
secondary meaning, both quantitatively and qualitatively, is vulnerable to 
greater loss from reputation harm. If this analysis is correct, then acquired 
strength is not so much about the probability that consumers will be 
confused (in other words, whether this probability is higher or lower), but 
rather about the harm that such confusion might generate.220 
 
218  See 4 id. § 24:49 (“Some courts have even said that the strength of the senior user’s mark is 
perhaps the most important factor in the multi-point analysis.”); Beebe, supra note 1, at 1612, 1620 
(demonstrating a strong correlation between the strength-of-the-mark factor and judicial findings of 
likely confusion). 
219  See infra Part IV.B.1. 
220  Inherent strength is also relevant to harm, but in a different way. A firm that has a monopoly 
over a descriptive mark can make it more difficult for competitors to describe their products in a 
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4. Intent.—As we have seen, the intent factor refers to the 
defendant’s intent in adopting the mark.221 Intent plays a dual role in the 
infringement analysis. First, it serves an obvious evidentiary function. 
When a firm adopts a similar mark to deceive consumers, it is reasonable to 
assume that the firm believes deception is likely. The firm’s belief thus 
deserves considerable evidentiary weight given that it knows the market 
and is in a good position to predict consumer response.222 
But the intent factor also serves a normative function. As Part IV will 
show, the intentionality of the deception itself is a reason to condemn the 
use on moral grounds. The problem, however, is that intent’s normative 
function is obscured by including it as a factor in a likelihood of confusion 
test that purports to be strictly empirical and predictive. A judge who takes 
seriously the doctrinal focus on probability of confusion will tend to see 
only intent’s evidentiary significance. On the other hand, a judge convinced 
that liability should be imposed because of the defendant’s moral 
culpability will be inclined to force a likelihood of confusion finding even 
when the other factors do not lend strong support. This only adds to the 
apparent inconsistency and incoherence of the multifactor test.223 
C. Inadequate Normative Foundation 
There is an even deeper problem with the likelihood of confusion test: 
It lacks a clear normative foundation. Confusion is not a problem in itself. 
People are confused all the time and the law does nothing to lend 
assistance. Thus, preventing consumer confusion is justified only if the 
confusion is associated with morally culpable conduct or causes sufficient 
harm. 
A confusion-focused test might be acceptable if a risk of consumer 
confusion correlated strongly with bad conduct or harmful consequences. In 
 
prominent way, at least when there are few equally effective descriptors available for the purpose. A 
firm with a fanciful mark like AFARION has no such power because the mark says nothing about the 
product and thus confers no competitive advantage. Because the monopoly costs of protecting an 
inherently distinctive mark are lower, somewhat broader protection is justified. 
221  See supra notes 175–79 and accompanying text. The intent factor appears explicitly in all the 
circuits’ likelihood of confusion tests except for the Federal Circuit’s. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, 
§§ 24:29–:43; Beebe, supra note 1, at 1584. 
222  See Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 543 n.3 (2d Cir. 1955) 
(noting a firm’s intent to cause confusion “is relevant as an opinion by one familiar with market 
conditions”); see also 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, §§ 23:110–:111 (explaining the inference that can 
be drawn from intent to confuse and summarizing circuit courts’ views on the evidentiary weight of this 
inference). Even the original Restatement relied on the evidentiary argument for the intent factor without 
mentioning its moral significance. See 3 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 729 cmt. f, 731 cmt. g (1938). 
223  See Beebe, supra note 1, at 1631 (noting that “a finding of bad faith intent exerts excessive 
influence on the outcome of the multifactor test,” that “courts employ the multifactor test to reach what 
they deem to be the right result,” and that “if trademark law seeks to prevent commercial immorality, 
then it should do so explicitly” rather than through “distorted findings of fact as to the likelihood of 
consumer confusion”). 
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that case, focusing on confusion alone would get the right result most of the 
time and save the costs of a more fact-intensive inquiry. Although this 
makes sense for competing products where the correlation between likely 
confusion and potential harm is strong,224 it makes much less sense for 
noncompeting products. In the latter case, as Part IV explains, a defendant 
can copy a mark or free ride on goodwill without intending to deceive and 
without causing serious harm to the mark’s capacity to communicate 
reliable information to consumers. The correlation between likely confusion 
and potential harm is thus not nearly as strong. 
Put simply, liability should depend on the moral character of the 
defendant’s conduct or the expected trademark-related harm from 
confusion. But this means that the likelihood of confusion test is either 
irrelevant or incomplete. Insofar as liability depends on the morality of the 
defendant’s conduct, the likelihood of confusion test is irrelevant; liability 
should instead focus on the nature of the moral wrong and on confusion 
only if it is part of that wrong. Insofar as liability turns on confusion-
generated harm, the likelihood of confusion test is incomplete. Probability 
of confusion is certainly relevant to liability, but liability should also 
depend on the severity of the harm that confusion is likely to generate.225 
This analysis invites additional questions. If morality plays a role in the 
infringement analysis, which moral principles are relevant, and how? What 
confusion-generated harms ought to count for trademark purposes, and how 
should those harms figure in a liability determination? Part IV addresses 
these questions. 
IV. RECONSTRUCTING THE INFRINGEMENT TEST 
Any effort to reconstruct the infringement test should start with the 
reasons why marks are protected and then fit the test to those reasons. 
Starting with reasons is complicated, however, by the fact that modern 
accounts of trademark law tend to rely on an incomplete or imprecise 
account of trademark’s goals. These accounts fall into two camps. One 
camp views the social value of trademark protection in economic terms and 
focuses on reducing consumer search costs.226 This camp argues that the 
 
224  See Bone, supra note 13, at 2123–43 (using an enforcement-cost argument to justify focusing on 
a showing of likely confusion as presumptive of liability for competing products given the strong 
correlation between likely confusion and harm in that setting). 
225  See infra Part IV.B.1. 
226  See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 15, at 166–68 (describing the social benefits of 
trademark protection in terms of reducing the costs to consumers of obtaining information about 
products); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, A Search-Costs Theory of Limiting Doctrines in 
Trademark Law, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 1223, 1223–27 (2007) (using search-cost theory to justify 
doctrines limiting trademark rights); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer 
Search Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 786–88 (2004). [hereinafter Dogan & Lemley, 
Search Costs on the Internet] (using search-cost theory to check excessively broad applications of 
trademark law to Internet uses). 
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most problematic expansions are due to judges forgetting trademark law’s 
consumer-oriented function and instead placing emphasis on other 
concerns, such as anti-free-riding principles.227 The other camp sees 
trademark law as a more open-ended unfair competition tort.228 On this 
view, the law is not limited to reducing search costs but instead reflects a 
complex balance of values that cannot be exhaustively enumerated in 
advance and that depend on the facts of each particular case.229 
Each approach has something to offer. The search cost model focuses 
on an important—perhaps the most important—goal of trademark law: to 
police the information transmission function of marks in order to maintain 
their effectiveness in enabling efficient consumer search. The problem with 
this model, however, is that its economic focus submerges the moral 
dimension of trademark law. The unfair competition model is helpful in this 
regard. Unfair competition was originally conceived as a tort that enabled 
judges to police the fairness and morality of market conduct in a world 
where competitors constantly invented new ways to gain a market 
advantage.230 Today, this history stands as a reminder that, while economic 
goals are critical to trademark law, morality should, and does, play a role in 
shaping infringement standards. Still, the unfair competition model is also 
ad hoc and imprecise. It relies on judges making pragmatic all-things-
considered decisions, which by their nature are subjective and open-ended. 
We can and should be more precise and more transparent about the moral 
theories that count in trademark law. 
The following discussion draws on both models. It has two main 
purposes. First, it aims to present a more careful analysis of the moral 
dimension of trademark law and subject candidate moral theories to critical 
analysis. Other scholars have criticized free-riding arguments that assume it 
is morally wrong to free ride on a trademark owner’s goodwill, and I 
summarize those criticisms in Part IV.A.3 below. However, anti-free-riding 
is not the only moral argument with intuitive appeal. For example, 
consumer autonomy and identity rights support superficially attractive 
 
227  See, e.g., Dogan & Lemley, Search Costs on the Internet, supra note 226, at 779–82, 805; Mark 
A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1695–1701, 
1705 (1999). 
228  See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Developing Defenses in Trademark Law, 13 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 99, 107–08 (2009) (likening trademark law to unfair competition and rejecting any notion that 
the values of trademark law can be reduced to a single rationale or metric); Graeme B. Dinwoodie & 
Mark D. Janis, Confusion over Use: Contextualism in Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1597, 1614 
n.71 (2007) (explaining that, although trademark law was originally narrower than unfair competition, it 
has been “expanded liberally to conform with the more generous contours of unfair competition 
principles”). 
229  See Dinwoodie, supra note 228, at 101 n.1, 107–08; see also id. at 121 (enumerating a 
nonexhaustive list of eight values that underpin trademark law). 
230  See JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS, TRADENAMES, AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 1 (4th ed. 1924); Edward S. Rogers, Comments on the Modern Law of Unfair Trade, 
3 ILL. L. REV. 551, 551–52 (1909). 
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moral theories that can—and I believe do—influence infringement findings. 
Thus, it is important to examine these arguments openly to guard against 
judges relying on them improperly to render excessively broad trademark 
decisions.231 
The second purpose of the discussion is to explore the implications of 
an economic theory for optimal liability standards. For this purpose, I return 
to first principles and defend a bifurcated infringement analysis that focuses 
on trademark-related harm as well as on likely confusion.232 
A. Moral Justifications 
1. Intentional Deception.—The law of trademark infringement 
originally grew out of the tort of fraud and required proof of intentional 
deception.233 Over time, intent gradually disappeared as a required element. 
Today, even innocent adoption of a confusingly similar mark is 
actionable.234 Still, courts find infringement much more readily when 
intentional deception is involved. In many jurisdictions, proof of bad intent 
supports a rebuttable presumption of likely confusion.235 
As we saw in Part III, it makes sense on evidentiary grounds to infer 
likely confusion from intentional deception: when the defendant intends to 
deceive, there is good reason to believe that deception is likely.236 The 
problem, however, is that focusing on the evidentiary significance of intent 
ignores its normative function from a moral point of view. 
When the defendant adopts a mark with intent to deceive consumers, 
the defendant sets out to deliberately lie, and deliberate lying is a reason to 
 
231  The draft of a forthcoming article by Professor Jeremy Sheff, which applies a contractarian 
approach to derive moral principles for trademark law, stands out as a notable exception to the paucity 
of moral analysis in trademark scholarship. See Jeremy N. Sheff, Marks, Morals, and Markets, STAN. L. 
REV. (forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2021394. This is 
not the place to discuss Professor Sheff’s article with care. He makes a number of interesting and useful 
points, but in the end I am not persuaded by his contractarian arguments. 
232  The following discussion focuses mainly on policy. Its objective is to construct a more sensible 
approach to the infringement analysis and to suggest changes in the law that better fit that approach. It is 
a separate question whether all of these changes can be implemented within the current statutory 
framework of the Lanham Act, and I do not discuss that question with any care. If some of the proposed 
changes cannot be implemented, the statute would have to be amended to permit them. 
233  See, e.g., 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 5:2. 
234  See 4 id. §§ 23:106–:107. For example, the defendant might use the mark in a location distant 
from the plaintiff’s marketing area and therefore be unaware of the plaintiff’s prior use. Or the defendant 
might adopt the mark for use on a different yet related product, honestly believing that consumers will 
not be confused. Nevertheless, the junior user in each case may still be sued. See id. 
235  See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 258 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that 
evidence of a bad faith intent to copy the plaintiff’s trademark established a rebuttable presumption); 
4 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, §§ 23:110–:112 (noting that evidence of an intent to cause confusion 
establishes “a presumption that deception and confusion resulted” and that “its presence may turn the 
scales in a close case” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
236  See supra note 222 and accompanying text. 
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condemn the action on moral grounds.237 Morally culpable intent alone is 
not enough for infringement liability. The law does not normally intervene 
based on a bad mental state by itself; some type of harm is necessary as 
well. Here the requisite harm exists when an actor’s intent to deceive results 
in actual deception. But harm in the form of deception need not actually 
materialize before an injunction is granted; it is enough that the risk of harm 
is significant and sufficiently imminent.238 It is here that the evidentiary 
function of intent fits in: it establishes the requisite risk of actual deception, 
and thus harm, by way of inference. In sum, proof of intent to deceive 
establishes a basis for moral condemnation, which, when combined with the 
inference of deception-based harm, supports trademark liability. 
Furthermore, it makes sense on moral grounds to make the inference of 
harm conclusive, rather than rebuttable as it is today. A defendant who is 
acting with morally culpable intent should not be able to argue that the 
circumstances make it unlikely that he can carry out his intent because the 
products are too remote or consumers are too sophisticated.239 Also, the 
defendant’s argument in most cases will at best show that deception is 
unlikely, not that it is impossible, and any residual uncertainty should be 
resolved against the moral wrongdoer and in favor of the innocent party. 
Finally, although not directly relevant to the moral argument, it is worth 
noting that a conclusive presumption saves the litigation costs of rebuttal 
and also reduces the uncertainty that a rebuttable presumption inevitably 
creates.240 
Recognizing the moral significance of intent has an important 
implication. It supports a much simpler test for granting injunctive relief 
than the multifactor likelihood of confusion test. A plaintiff should be able 
to enjoin use of a mark with proof only that the defendant intended to 
deceive consumers about source or sponsorship, and without a full-blown 
likelihood of confusion analysis. This simple test changes current law in 
two respects. First, it completely removes the intent factor from the 
 
237  Morality plays an important role in many aspects of trademark law notwithstanding the law’s 
strict liability focus. For example, proof of wrongful intent supports broader forms of relief. See Adray 
v. Adry-Mart, Inc., 76 F.3d 984, 988 (9th Cir. 1995) (explaining that profits can be recovered on an 
unjust-enrichment theory only if the infringement is willful); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 35 cmt. c (1995) (noting that proof of willful or intentional conduct can support broader 
injunctive relief). Moreover, reasonable attorney’s fees may be recovered only in exceptional cases, see 
15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2006); 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 30:99, and an exceptional case usually 
requires “intentional, deliberate[,] or willful infringement.” Id. § 30:100; see also id. §§ 26:4, :6–:10 
(explaining the relevance of bad faith in extending trademark protection to remote areas). 
238  See 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 30:10. 
239  See 3 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 729 cmt. f (1938) (noting that the defendant’s “denial that his 
conduct was likely to achieve the result intended by him will ordinarily carry little weight,” though not 
explaining why). 
240  In fact, courts appear to treat the presumption as “nearly un-rebuttable” in practice. Beebe, supra 
note 1, at 1628–29 (reporting that all but one of fifty preliminary injunction decisions and all but one of 
seventeen bench trials in which the court found bad faith resulted in a finding of likely confusion). 
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likelihood of confusion test. This is sensible because intent is not just a 
predictive factor; it also has normative relevance. Second, the simple test 
treats intent as a distinct basis for finding infringement liability, which, in 
effect, converts the existing rebuttable presumption of likely confusion 
based on proof of intentional deception into a conclusive presumption. 
There is, however, a problem with the way many judges use intent 
today. The strong presumption appropriate only for morally culpable intent 
has been extended to cover cases where the intent is not morally culpable at 
all. For example, many courts infer deceptive intent from intent to copy the 
plaintiff’s mark, and some treat intent to free ride on the plaintiff’s goodwill 
as sufficient for a strong presumption of likely confusion and thus of 
liability.241 This is a serious mistake because there is nothing morally wrong 
about doing these things. For example, copying is often permitted for 
product features that are not protected by patent or copyright.242 Moreover, 
courts grant some latitude for copying marks to create parodies.243 Indeed, 
as many have pointed out and as Part IV.A.3 below elaborates, free riding is 
perfectly acceptable in a wide range of situations.244 
The confusion-only, predictive focus of the current likelihood of 
confusion test is responsible for this sloppy use of intent. If one considers 
only intent’s evidentiary function, it makes sense to credit all these different 
types of intent: they are all probative of consumer confusion to some 
extent.245 However, when one recognizes the moral function of intent, it 
becomes clear that not all types of intent qualify for moral condemnation. 
This insight should be evident to anyone who thinks carefully about the 
moral status of deceptive intent. But the likelihood of confusion test gets in 
the way of clear thinking by diverting attention away from the moral and 
towards the purely predictive.246 
 
241  See supra note 179 and accompanying text. 
242  See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29–30 (2001) (recognizing that, 
in general, one can copy product features that are not protected by patent or copyright). 
243  See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir. 2002) (recognizing the 
public interest in free expression that protects parodies). 
244  See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the 
Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 167 (1992) (“A culture could not exist if all free riding were 
prohibited within it.”); William P. Kratzke, Normative Economic Analysis of Trademark Law, 
21 MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REV. 199, 223 (1991) (arguing that free riders can create value and foster 
competition). 
245  Although there are perfectly valid reasons for intentionally copying a mark, it seems likely in 
cases of word marks and ordinary market competition that the purpose would be to confuse consumers. 
So too, while firms can certainly free ride on goodwill without confusing consumers, they are more 
likely to succeed if consumers are in fact confused. 
246  I am not suggesting that the predictive focus of the modern likelihood of confusion test is the 
only reason for the problem. Some judges actually believe that free riding on goodwill is morally 
wrongful despite the contrary arguments. Still, by submerging moral considerations, the likelihood of 
confusion test at least makes it more difficult to debate these questionable beliefs. 
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The lesson is clear. The moral function of intentional deception should 
be brought to the fore and explicitly factored into the construction of 
liability rules. Doing so shows why the simple test is justified: a plaintiff 
should be able to enjoin use of a mark by proving that the defendant 
adopted the mark with the intent to deceive consumers. It also shows why it 
is so important to distinguish different types of intent carefully. 
Two additional observations deserve brief mention.247 First, it is 
important that the relevant intent targets consumers. For example, the 
simple test should not apply to post-sale confusion, such as selling jeans 
with the Levi’s stitching pattern to consumers who know they are not 
buying Levi’s jeans.248 One might argue that the seller intends to deceive 
members of the general public who might assume from the stitching pattern 
that they are looking at Levi’s jeans. But this assumption about intent is 
highly suspect. It is much more likely that the seller simply intends to 
compete on equal terms with Levi’s by using a feature of the jeans that has 
significant consumption value. Or if the stitching pattern is coupled with a 
funny twist, the seller might wish to use a humorous play on a popular 
symbol to sell its jeans. Either way, the intent should not be treated as 
morally culpable because it does not aim to confuse the consumer at the 
point of purchase. 
Second, while deception has a core of fairly clear meaning, deceptive 
intent, like other mental states, is difficult to define precisely. Moral 
philosophers and legal scholars disagree about the meaning of intent in 
criminal law and the law of intentional tort just as they disagree about 
mental states and their relationship to moral culpability more generally.249 In 
this respect, there is an advantage to making the moral function of intent 
transparent in trademark law and building a simple test around it. Doing so 
will force judges to focus on the type of intent necessary for infringement 
and rigorously define the contours of deceptive intent in the trademark field. 
2. Consumer Autonomy.—Here we consider the possibility that there 
is moral value in consumers making informed and autonomous choices 
based on accurate product information. We have already seen Judge Charles 
Clark allude to consumer autonomy in one case.250 Moreover, Professor 
 
247  It is also worth mentioning that proof of intent might involve some of the same evidence as is 
currently used to prove likelihood of confusion. Still, not all likelihood of confusion factors are relevant 
to determining intent. More important, the goal of an intent inquiry is not to make a general and 
somewhat amorphous prediction of likely confusion, but rather to conduct a more focused inquiry into 
culpability. 
248  See Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1986). 
249  See, e.g., Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship 
Between Legal and Moral Accountability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1511, 1517–24 (1992) (“There are many 
different accounts of when individuals deserve moral blame for causing some undesirable state of 
affairs.”). See generally George P. Fletcher, The Nature and Function of Criminal Theory, 88 CALIF. L. 
REV. 687 (2000) (tracing different philosophical and legal theories of criminal intent). 
250  See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
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Thomas McCarthy suggests the possibility that consumers are “entitled to 
be told the truth about the origin or sponsorship of products.”251 McCarthy’s 
entitlement is not just a right not to be lied to. It extends beyond cases of 
intentional deception to those involving innocent adoption that confuses 
consumers and even to cases where the qualities of the defendant’s products 
are identical to the plaintiff’s in all material respects.252 
At first glance, there is something intuitively appealing about a right to 
consumer autonomy. But if the right has more than rhetorical force, it must 
guarantee each consumer accurate or at least non-confusing information. 
For that is how individual rights work in general; they give each individual 
rightholder a claim that cannot be easily outweighed by collective goals or 
aggregate welfare.253 As I have explained elsewhere, recognizing a right of 
this sort in trademark law is hopelessly incoherent and impractical.254 Given 
the high variance in consumer abilities to process information and the 
subjectivity of interpretation, there is always a chance that at least one 
consumer will misunderstand a message conveyed by a trademark and act 
on the basis of her mistaken impressions.255 Therefore, if consumers had the 
supposed right, it would be impossible for any seller to behave morally—an 
obviously absurd result. One might argue that the right is to reasonable 
accuracy, rather than perfect accuracy. However, this just begs the question 
of what is “reasonable.” 
Perhaps consumer autonomy can influence trademark law as a moral 
value rather than as a right.256 If so, consumer autonomy must derive its 
force from the moral value attaching to individual autonomy more 
generally.257 It is not obvious, however, that a Kantian or other theory of 
personal autonomy can underwrite a distinct moral value in consumer 
 
251  4 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 24:16; accord 1 id. § 2:35 (“[T]he consumer’s right to be told 
the truth not only extends to the facts about the nature and quality of the product, but also extends to the 
true facts about the source and sponsorship of the products purchased.”). 
252  See 4 id. § 24:16 (noting that a mistake about source or sponsorship creates a “real and 
independent injury to [the consumer’s] rights regardless of whether or not she is economically injured by 
the poor quality of the infringer’s goods or services”). 
253  See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 90–100 (1978); THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL 
QUESTIONS 112–15, 131–33 (Canto ed. 1991). 
254  Bone, supra note 13, at 2109–11. 
255  Cf. Richard Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U. L. REV. 657, 672–78 (1985) 
(making this point for false advertising). 
256  At this point, one must be careful not to confuse moral with economic values. From an economic 
perspective, consumer autonomy is valuable only because it supports an efficient market that enhances 
social welfare, and as a result it should be protected only to the extent that it furthers social goals. For 
discussion of the economic perspective, see infra Part IV.B. 
257  There is an extensive philosophical literature devoted to theories of personal autonomy. See, 
e.g., GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY (1988) (discussing different 
conceptions of autonomy in the context of various moral issues). 
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autonomy.258 To be sure, the market is an important locus of choice, but it is 
not choice in itself that has value. For example, one common view equates 
the value of autonomy with self-determination, that is, with the ability of 
individuals to choose their own conceptions of the good life, their own life 
plans, personal commitments, and personal projects.259 One might try to 
derive consumer autonomy from this more general conception by arguing 
that the only way a good life can seem attainable—and thus worth 
choosing—is if the individual has freedom to choose the goods and services 
necessary to implement a life plan. This is a promising beginning, but more 
work needs to be done. 
Even assuming that consumer autonomy makes sense as a moral value, 
its scope and weight must still be defined. For example, while source 
confusion is an obvious concern, it is difficult to see how initial-interest 
confusion or post-sale confusion would be morally problematic given that 
in both the consumer is not confused at the point of purchase. Moreover, it 
seems reasonable to suppose that only confusion about matters of serious 
consequence should trigger moral concern. Indeed, consumer autonomy as 
a moral value might be confined to the choice of basic goods and services, 
such as a home, education, and medical care, which are strongly tied to self-
determination and self-constitution. 
This is not the place to examine these issues with care. My point is 
only that trademark scholars should engage the moral argument more 
seriously. One reason has to do with its implications for the infringement 
analysis. While nonutilitarian moral values can be outweighed by other 
values of comparable moral force, including autonomy values that pull in 
the opposite direction,260 they are not easily outweighed by high social costs 
or other concerns having to do with aggregate social welfare. Another 
reason to engage the issues critically is to clarify the moral stakes so that 
judges are not moved by the intuitive appeal of consumer autonomy to 
render unjustifiably broad infringement decisions. If consumer autonomy is 
affecting decisions implicitly, it is important to make it explicit and give it 
the critical attention it warrants. 
3. Free Riding.—Free riding has had a rocky history in trademark 
law. Judges in the Second Circuit disagreed sharply about its significance 
 
258  Cf. Laura A. Heymann, The Public’s Domain in Trademark Law: A First Amendment Theory of 
the Consumer, 43 GA. L. REV. 651, 660–64, 692–714 (2009) (invoking a Kantian conception of 
autonomy to support consumer autonomy as a value to justify limiting the scope of trademark 
protection). 
259  See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 257, at 12–20, 31. 
260  See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and Amish Children: Autonomy, Information, and Law, 
76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 50–56 (2001) (exploring ways that broad intellectual property rights empower 
private actors to limit the autonomy of individuals); Heymann, supra note 258, at 692–714 (invoking 
consumer autonomy to limit trademark protection when marks serve persuasive rather than source-
identifying functions). 
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during the 1940s and 1950s. Judge Clark believed that the law should 
prevent free riding on a trademark owner’s hard-earned goodwill, while 
Judges Hand and Frank insisted that free riding on goodwill was not bad in 
itself.261 Moreover, a belief that free riding is morally bad played a role in 
justifying the broadest trademark expansions during the twentieth 
century.262 Courts today still rely on an anti-free-riding principle to justify 
liability in cases at the edges of trademark law, such as those involving 
initial interest and post-sale confusion.263 
Many scholars offer compelling criticisms of the anti-free-riding 
principle, and I will only briefly summarize two of those criticisms here.264 
First, and most important, the anti-free-riding principle is descriptively 
inaccurate and normatively flawed. In fact, free riding is pervasive and 
much of the time perfectly acceptable. For example, the first firm to sell 
food processors creates consumer demand not only for its specific brand but 
also for food processors in general. When another firm enters the food 
processor market selling under its own completely different brand, it free 
rides on the efforts of the pioneer to promote public acceptance of food 
processors. Yet this conduct is not considered morally bad; in fact, it is 
encouraged as socially beneficial competition. Indeed, free riding occurs in 
very ordinary situations without triggering any moral concern. If Joe 
overhears Jane explaining something interesting (and not private) at a 
neighboring lunch table, Joe can pass along the information without getting 
Jane’s consent and without risking moral approbation.265 
Second, the anti-free-riding principle taken to its logical extreme does 
not fit trademark law. It supports liability whenever a firm free rides, 
whether or not the free riding is accomplished through consumer confusion. 
But trademark law, at its traditional core, does not extend this far. It was 
never meant to prevent free riding per se. It was meant to prevent the use of 
marks that cause consumer confusion.266 
 
261  See supra notes 106, 111, 123, 138 and accompanying text. 
262  See Bone, Hunting Goodwill, supra note 35, at 550–51. 
263  See, e.g., Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1018–19 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(initial interest confusion); Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 
295 (3d Cir. 2001) (initial interest confusion); Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1243 
(6th Cir. 1991) (post-sale confusion); Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 
874–75 (2d Cir. 1986) (post-sale confusion). 
264  See supra note 244 and accompanying text. 
265  One might try to argue that creators have a natural right to exclusivity over their creations on 
Lockean labor-desert grounds. See JOHN LOCKE, Second Treatise of Government, in TWO TREATISES OF 
GOVERNMENT §§ 25–51 (Peter Laslett ed., 2d ed. 1970) (1698) (arguing for a natural right to the fruits 
of one’s labor). But the Lockean theory has numerous flaws, including that it cannot account for the 
pervasive social practice of benefiting freely from value others create. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & 
Mark P. McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, 109 MICH. L. REV. 137, 181–84 (2010) (criticizing the natural 
rights theory). 
266  See supra Parts I.B.2, II. 
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These are powerful criticisms of the anti-free-riding principle. They 
have been repeated so often that it is puzzling why so many courts still rely 
on the principle to justify expansive trademark decisions. Either these 
judges have not understood the message or they believe something else is at 
stake in addition to free riding. One possibility has to do with the close 
association of goodwill with reputation and firm identity. In brief, a judge 
might believe that taking goodwill is morally impermissible when it also 
involves stealing a firm’s identity.267 The following section discusses this 
argument in more detail. 
4. Appropriation of Firm Identity.—Though ultimately flawed in the 
way I explain below, the idea that taking trademarks is morally wrong 
because it amounts to stealing a firm’s identity has intuitive appeal. When A 
takes B’s name or other aspects of B’s personal identity and passes herself 
off as B, there is reason to condemn the action on moral grounds. The 
problem is not just that the practice is inefficient or that people might have 
suboptimal incentives to develop distinctive identities and reputations. 
There is something morally offensive about taking another’s identity. 
The law recognizes this intuition for ordinary individuals. The right of 
publicity protects core elements of personal identity—such as name, 
portrait, picture, and the like—from appropriation for commercial 
purposes.268 When celebrities are involved, protection can be justified on 
economic grounds, since a celebrity’s identity has substantial commercial 
value. But publicity rights apply even when the victim is not a celebrity, 
and the most persuasive justification for this application is a personhood 
theory that recognizes a moral right to protect elements of self deeply tied 
to personhood.269 The idea is that taking another person’s identity is an 
offense to that person’s autonomy and her freedom to construct a distinctive 
 
267  Another possibility is that judges worry about the unanticipated consequences of narrower 
protection given the importance of trademarks and brands in the modern economy. The problem with 
this concern is that it can easily justify excessive deference to existing practice. The fact that firms 
behave in certain ways does not make their behavior socially optimal. For example, firms have 
incentives to appropriate all the goodwill value in their marks even when exclusive appropriation chills 
competition (as in trade dress cases) or impedes creative and desirable uses of marks (as in the 
expressive-use and Internet cases). 
268  See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY §§ 1:30, 4:46 (2d ed. 
2009). 
269  See, e.g., Mark P. McKenna, The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 U. PITT. 
L. REV. 225, 279–85 (2005); Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 
978–79 (1982). What we now refer to as publicity rights law originally grew out of the right of privacy 
and was first recognized for ordinary individuals based on values of personal integrity and autonomy. 
See Robert C. Denicola, Institutional Publicity Rights: An Analysis of the Merchandising of Famous 
Trade Symbols, 62 N.C. L. REV. 603, 621 (1984). The right was then expanded to protect the 
commercial value of celebrity identity, which shifted attention toward economic (and, to some extent, 
labor-desert) arguments. Id. at 620–22. For a critique of some of the moral theories used to support 
publicity rights, see Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn from 
Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1180–84 (2006). 
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self. The question is whether the same idea extends to taking a firm’s brand 
identity as well. 
The connection between trademark law and publicity rights has not 
escaped attention. When publicity rights law was first developed, courts and 
commentators frequently drew analogies to trademark law.270 Just as the law 
protects a firm’s goodwill, they argued, so too it should protect an 
individual’s reputation. The analogy was imperfect doctrinally because 
trademark law protects only against likely confusion, while publicity rights 
protect against appropriation of identity regardless of confusion.271 But its 
appeal was still strong at the level of justification. 
Courts and commentators have made the reverse connection as well. In 
Part II,272 we saw Judge Learned Hand, during his liberal pro-trademark 
phase in the 1920s, drawing on the identity-appropriation idea explicitly: 
“[A] reputation, like a face,” he wrote, “is the symbol of its possessor and 
creator, and another can use it only as a mask.”273 Judge Hand did not refer 
to publicity rights explicitly—that body of law would not take shape for 
another twenty-five years274—but the analogy to personal identity is 
unmistakable. More recently, commentators have drawn the connection to 
publicity rights explicitly and analyzed the relationship of trademark law to 
identity.275 
Given the overlap, it might be tempting to justify trademark law as a 
mechanism for protecting a moral right to firm identity. Indeed, the 
argument might seem particularly compelling in the context of brands. 
 
270  See, e.g., Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Denicola, supra note 269, 
at 623 (making this point). 
271  See Denicola, supra note 269, at 623–24. 
272  See supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text. 
273  Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928); see also Bond Stores, Inc. v. 
Bond Stores, Inc., 104 F.2d 124, 125 (3d Cir. 1939) (“The annoyance felt by those who do business 
under a corporate name when the same name is used by others, is very much akin to that of the 
patronymically proud, when a newly admitted citizen assumes their family name.”); Premier-Pabst 
Corp. v. Elm City Brewing Co., 9 F. Supp. 754, 758 (D. Conn. 1935) (rejecting the notion that the right 
to a name or mark is part of goodwill that should be protected exclusively, and instead basing the right 
on the “common-law right of a man to have such an identity in the public eye as he can win by his 
conduct and personality”). 
274  See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953). 
275  See, e.g., Denicola, supra note 269, at 623–27 (noting and criticizing efforts to defend trademark 
rights by analogy to publicity rights); J. Thomas McCarthy, Public Personas and Private Property: The 
Commercialization of Human Identity, 79 TRADEMARK REP. 681, 689 (1989) (“In an effort to expand 
the scope of rights in corporate symbols and trademarks, some plaintiff’s attorneys have tried to stuff 
these kinds of corporate and business symbols into the category of the right of publicity.”); McKenna, 
supra note 269, at 289–90 (noting the connection between publicity rights and antidilution theories of 
trademark law); Ellen P. Winner, Right of Identity: Right of Publicity and Protection for a Trademark’s 
“Persona,” 71 TRADEMARK REP. 193 (1981) (arguing for broad trademark rights by analogy to 
publicity rights); see also Laura A. Heymann, Naming, Identity, and Trademark Law, 86 IND. L.J. 381, 
393–97 (2011) (discussing the denotative, connotative, and associational functions of personal names 
and trademarks). 
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Branding as we know it today is a relatively recent marketing phenomenon, 
and companies invest huge amounts in building a brand image.276 The brand 
is a super trademark that embodies a firm’s personality, image, and values. 
A firm usually applies its brand to everything it sells in order to maintain a 
consistent image, imbue the products with the firm’s personality, and build 
additional value in the brand. For example, the “Apple Macintosh” and 
“Harley Davidson” brands have strong personalities.277 
Thus, a brand for a firm is similar to a personal name for an individual. 
A brand not only denotes the firm, but it also connotes the firm’s identity.278 
This suggests the possibility of according brands the same normative 
treatment as personal names and using trademark law to extend to firms the 
personhood protection that publicity rights give individuals.279 Although I 
shall argue that this is a mistake, I believe that the idea’s strong intuitive 
appeal might be responsible for some of the broader trademark decisions.280 
For those judges swayed implicitly by the notion of protecting firm identity, 
the problem is not just that the defendant is free riding on something of 
value that the plaintiff has created; it is rather that the defendant is 
appropriating the plaintiff’s identity and the reputation it has worked hard to 
cultivate. 
 
276  For useful accounts of the branding phenomenon and its growing importance over the past thirty 
years, see Katya Assaf, Brand Fetishism, 43 CONN. L. REV. 83, 92–103 (2010), and Deven R. Desai, A 
Brand Theory of Trademark Law 10–21 (Thomas Jefferson Sch. of Law, Research Paper No. 1585327, 
2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1585327. 
277  See Assaf, supra note 276, at 95–97 (mentioning these and other examples in discussing “brand 
fetishism”). Indeed, people use these brands to express their own lifestyle and values. Other examples 
include the Nike swoosh brand and sports team logos and marks. 
278  See Heymann, supra note 275 (distinguishing denotative and connotative functions of names and 
marks). 
279  There is a parallel in trade secret law. While the common law right of privacy attaches only to 
individuals, some see trade secret law as providing the functional equivalent for corporations. See 
Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86 CALIF. L. 
REV. 241, 284–89 (1998) (criticizing this line of argument). 
280  Some judges invoked the notion of protecting identity in the early trademark cases, see supra 
note 273, but it is difficult to find clear references today. This does not mean, however, that judges are 
not influenced by the intuition. Judges sometimes refer to taking a firm’s reputation in anti-free-riding 
arguments, but these references are difficult to distinguish from the idea of taking goodwill. A concern 
with identity rights might underlie a common argument used to justify trademark protection in cases 
where the defendant’s product is high quality. In these cases, courts sometimes invoke the trademark 
owner’s right to exclusive control over its own reputation. See, e.g., Carling Brewing Co. v. Philip 
Morris, Inc., 277 F. Supp. 326, 335 (N.D. Ga. 1967) (“[T]he rule remains: ‘It is not to be disputed that 
the plaintiff is not required to put its reputation in defendant’s hands, no matter how capable those hands 
may be.’” (quoting James Burrough, Ltd. v. Ferrara, 169 N.Y.S.2d 93, 96 (Sup. Ct. 1957))); 4 
MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 24:15 (noting that the concern is not just about the current quality but also 
about the future quality, and arguing that “[t]o deny relief upon the ground that defendant’s goods are 
not inferior today is to place plaintiff’s business reputation in the hands of a stranger over whom he has 
no control”). The argument in this form is puzzling since reputation cannot be at risk when the other 
firm is competent, responsible, and sells high-quality products. However, it makes more sense if it is 
understood as expressing a moral right to firm identity modeled on personal identity rights. 
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Notwithstanding its intuitive appeal, the argument from moral identity 
rights fails as a normative justification for protection in ordinary trademark 
cases. If individuals have moral rights to protect their own identities, it is 
because identity is closely connected with individual autonomy and self-
definition. Corporations, however, are artificial entities and not autonomous 
agents capable of formulating life plans and personal goals.281 It is not 
surprising then that the common law right of privacy, from which the 
personhood strand of publicity rights law developed, applies only to 
individuals and not to corporations.282 Moreover, while there is a superficial 
similarity between brands and personal names, the two are, in fact, quite 
different. Brands are developed for their economic value in selling products 
and not for their expressive value in connoting self-identity.283 
Still, there are cases where this moral right might justify trademark 
protection. These are cases in which the plaintiff’s business is closely tied 
to the identity of its owner. For example, suppose Frank Carroll, a local 
handyman with a major reputation, opens a small, individually owned 
repair shop and calls it CARROLL’S REPAIRS. It is quite possible that 
Frank Carroll would treat his repair shop as deeply entwined with his 
personal identity, perhaps even the most important aspect of who he is.284 In 
such a case, the name of Frank Carroll’s business might warrant moral-
rights protection. 
The possibility that in certain cases there might be a moral-rights basis 
for trademark infringement requires much more discussion than there is 
space for here. For one thing, it is not obvious that moral personhood 
applies to peripheral extensions of self like Frank Carroll’s business in the 
above example.285 Moreover, the elements of liability need more 
elaboration. For example, the plaintiff will have to show that the public 
associates the mark with his personal identity and treats the defendant’s 
 
281  See MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL THEORY FOR 
BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY 61–62 (1986). 
282  See S. Air Transp. Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 670 F. Supp. 38, 42 (D.D.C. 1987); 3 RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652I cmt. c (1977). Corporate entities do not have the capacity to suffer offense, 
humiliation, or emotional suffering essential to the privacy tort. This is particularly significant because 
the right of publicity for ordinary individuals grew out of the common law right of privacy. See supra 
note 269. 
283  Cf. Bone, supra note 279, at 288–89 (arguing that the commercial and technological information 
protected by trade secret law is not the type of subject matter that the moral right to privacy covers). 
284  It is worth pointing out that trademark law treats personal name marks with some solicitude. To 
be sure, these cases usually involve a defendant using his own personal name rather than a plaintiff 
seeking to protect a personal name mark, and the fact that the mark is the defendant’s name weighs in 
favor of limiting the scope of injunctive relief. See, e.g., E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 955 
F.2d 1327, 1336 (9th Cir. 1992); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, §§ 13:6–:8. Nevertheless, the cases are 
some evidence that trademark law places a special value on marks that reflect personal identity. 
285  Publicity rights apply to extensions of celebrity persona, such as the “Here’s Johnny” phrase for 
Johnny Carson. Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835–36 (6th Cir. 1983). 
But these applications are probably better justified on economic rather than personhood grounds. 
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mark as symbolizing that same identity. Although in theory this is different 
than proving secondary meaning and likely confusion, it can overlap 
significantly. Finally, if liability has a broad scope on personhood grounds, 
it is all the more important to craft defenses that protect socially important 
uses, such as parodying a mark. 
5. Summary.—The discussion so far shows that some moral 
arguments have force in trademark law. A moral norm against intentional 
deception justifies removing the intent factor from the likelihood of 
confusion test and making it the centerpiece of a separate test that enjoins 
any use of a mark made with intent to deceive consumers. Also, if 
consumer autonomy has moral value, it might support a rather strict 
infringement test in the context of confusion at the point of purchase about 
important aspects of basic goods and services, such as one’s home, 
education, and medical services. Finally, the moral right to identity based 
on personhood values might apply to uses of marks in connection with 
businesses deeply tied to the personal identity of their creators and owners. 
Equally important, however, there are superficially attractive moral 
arguments—consumer autonomy given force as a moral right, anti-free 
riding, and identity protection in most cases—that should not influence 
trademark decisions. 
B. Economic Justifications 
Moral arguments are relevant only to those cases that implicate moral 
norms. When those norms are not involved, the case is properly analyzed 
under an economic approach. Economic arguments focus on maximizing 
social welfare in the aggregate, not on guaranteeing what each person is due 
as a matter of fairness or justice. The following discussion outlines an 
approach to restructuring the liability test from an economic perspective in 
a way that takes account of the harm from confusion and not just the 
probability that confusion will occur. 
1. Expected Harm, Not Likely Confusion.—The goal of an economic 
analysis is to choose the legal rule that minimizes expected social costs.286 
Expected cost is the product of two factors: (1) the probability that a cost-
generating event will occur and (2) the magnitude of the social cost when it 
does occur.287 Applying this framework to trademark law, the expected cost 
of unauthorized trademark use depends on: (1) the probability that 
consumers will be confused and (2) the magnitude of the social harm if 
 
286  See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 17–20 (8th ed. 2011) (explaining 
the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency approach to determining legal outcomes). 
287  This point is nicely illustrated by the economic interpretation of Judge Hand’s B < P × L formula 
in negligence law. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). P × L is 
the expected cost of accidents: the product of the probability an accident will occur multiplied by the 
cost of the accident if it does occur. 
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confusion materializes. For example, a 50% chance of consumer confusion 
is much more troubling when the total social harm that confusion produces 
is $1 million than when it is only $100. Viewed from this perspective, the 
problem with the current likelihood of confusion test is obvious: It instructs 
judges to focus exclusively on the first factor without recognizing the 
importance of the second. 
The harms that concern trademark law are all related in one way or 
another to the content of product-related information that consumers receive 
and the cost of delivering or acquiring that information. Two of these harms 
are particularly salient: (1) the additional costs consumers incur in searching 
for information about product quality (consumer search costs) and (2) the 
costs that result from reduced incentives to invest in product quality when 
sellers cannot easily communicate the superior quality of their own 
products through their mark.288 At the same time, trademark law also 
generates costs of its own. These include the administrative and litigation 
costs of enforcing trademark rights, the risk of creating product monopolies 
with excessively broad trademark protection, and the risk of chilling 
expressive and other creative uses of marks.289 
The objective of an optimal system of trademark law is to minimize 
total expected social cost. For example, broader trademark rights can reduce 
search costs and increase incentives to invest in product quality, but they 
can also increase administrative and litigation costs and in some cases the 
risk of product monopolies and chilling effects. The social benefits of 
reducing expected search and inferior-quality costs must be balanced 
against the expected administrative, litigation, and other costs that the 
broader rights create. 
2. Constructing the New Liability Test.—Because of the focus on 
expected cost—which depends on both the probability of a cost-generating 
event and the magnitude of the cost when the event materializes—any 
liability test should be divided into two parts. The first involves estimating 
the probability that consumers will be confused, and the second involves 
estimating the magnitude of trademark-related harm when consumers are 
confused. 
a. Estimating probability of confusion.—The first part of the test 
should include only those factors strictly relevant to estimating the 
probability of consumer confusion. These include similarity of marks; 
proximity of products; consumer sophistication; instances of actual 
confusion; and specific features of market context, such as marketing 
channels, that influence consumer perceptions. However, bridge the gap and 
comparative quality do not belong in this part of the test. As we saw in Part 
 
288  See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text. 
289  LANDES & POSNER, supra note 15, at 166–74. 
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III, those factors collapse into product proximity in a test devoted 
exclusively to estimating probabilities.290 
It is less clear what role the strength-of-the-mark factor should play. As 
Part III explained, mark strength has no obvious connection to likelihood of 
confusion.291 Until some significant connection is confirmed empirically, it 
is better to leave this factor out of the first part of the test. Including mark 
strength risks biasing findings of likely confusion in favor of strong marks 
without a clear justification for doing so. 
It is also wise not to permit inferences from morally neutral forms of 
intent, such as intent to copy or to free ride. Although these types of intent 
have some evidentiary significance for predicting likely confusion, their 
probative value is relatively weak. Furthermore, given recent experience, 
there is too great a risk that they will be used to impose liability in cases 
where copying or free riding is associated with a socially desirable use.292 
b. Estimating confusion-related harm.—The second part of the 
test involves estimating confusion-related harm. The relevant factors 
depend on what harms trademark law should target. From an economic 
perspective, trademarks function as efficient devices for communicating 
product information to the market. It therefore follows that the broad goal 
of trademark law must be to prevent uses of marks that impair this 
information transmission function. 
When uses impair the functioning of a mark, both consumers and 
trademark owners can suffer harm. For example, search costs can increase 
for consumers, product quality can decline in the long run, and consumers 
can be misled into purchasing products they do not want. As for the 
trademark owner, it can lose sales, suffer reputation injury, and be 
foreclosed from using the mark in the defendant’s market. However, 
preventing these harms is not the core concern of trademark law. As Part 
I.A explained, the core concern from an economic perspective is to prevent 
impairment of the efficient information transmission function of the mark.293 
To be sure, the law is concerned about consumer and seller harms, but only 
insofar as those harms are causally linked to impairment of a mark’s 
informational function.294 For example, lost sales, while certainly harmful to 
 
290  See supra notes 197–204 and accompanying text. 
291  See supra notes 209–20 and accompanying text. 
292  See supra notes 241–46 and accompanying text. 
293  See supra notes 13–17 and accompanying text; see also LANDES & POSNER, supra note 15 
(describing the economic benefits of trademarks in terms of efficiently conveying information to 
consumers). 
294  Thus, I see no point in debating whether trademark law is supposed to protect only consumers or 
also producers. Trademark law protects both, but only insofar as doing so furthers the general goal of 
protecting the mark as an information transmission device. See Bone, Hunting Goodwill, supra note 35, 
at 560–61 & nn.58–59. But see Mark P. McKenna, Testing Modern Trademark Law’s Theory of Harm, 
95 IOWA L. REV. 63, 66–70 (2009) (arguing that it matters whether trademark law aims to prevent 
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the trademark owner, are of no concern to trademark law unless the losses 
affect the owner’s incentives to invest in the mark or in product quality 
communicated through the mark.295 In the following discussion, I shall use 
the term “trademark-related harm” to refer to those harms that are causally 
linked in an appropriate way to impairment of a mark’s information 
transmission function. 
(1) Competing products.—First, consider cases involving 
competing products and consumer confusion as to actual source. Search 
costs inevitably rise when consumers cannot rely on marks to identify a 
single source, and the risk that the defendant’s product is lower quality can 
trigger a downward quality spiral when the trademark owner responds by 
reducing the quality of her own product. Thus, source confusion almost 
certainly produces trademark-related harm, and, for this reason, harm 
should be presumed. 
But the presumption should not apply to all cases of competing 
products. The most notable exception is the merchandising rights cases.296 
These are cases in which the mark is the product itself. For example, the 
Red Sox organization sells or licenses others to sell RED SOX baseball 
caps, mugs, and other merchandise. Consumers buy these items not so 
much for the cap or mug, but for the RED SOX mark displayed on it. When 
another party sells similar merchandise without a license, there is little 
reason to believe that any confusion will generate trademark-related harm. 
Most consumers probably do not care whether the merchandise is officially 
authorized, and those who do care can order it directly from the trademark 
owner’s website or buy it from an official store (such as the Red Sox’s 
official store next to Fenway Park). Thus, search costs are not likely to be 
adversely affected. Moreover, there is no significant risk of a reduced 
quality when the defendant earns most of its profits from the mark’s 
popularity and has little to gain—and possibly reputation to lose—by using 
shoddy material to manufacture the merchandise. 
To be sure, the defendant is free riding on the popularity of the mark. 
But this free riding is not likely to impair the mark’s information 
transmission function. Indeed, it might strengthen it by bolstering 
consumers’ association of the trademark owner with the mark. It is possible 
 
consumer or producer harms and that trademark law historically was structured around preventing 
producer harms). 
295  Moral theories direct attention to different types of harm. For example, two of the moral theories 
discussed in Part IV.A.—the anti-free-riding principle and the personhood theory that supports a right to 
identity—by their nature, direct attention to the trademark owner; and one theory—consumer 
autonomy—directs attention to the consumer. But as we saw, these theories are highly problematic. 
296  For a critical discussion of the merchandising rights cases, see Dogan & Lemley, supra note 83. 
It is reasonable to treat the merchandising rights cases as competing products cases because the 
trademark owner is exploiting, directly or indirectly, the same merchandising rights market that the 
defendant occupies. 
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that the trademark owner will invest less in the underlying activity, 
knowing that the merchandising market will be less lucrative. But this is not 
a trademark-related harm. The purpose of trademark law is not to generate 
incentives to create—that is the province of copyright and patent law.297 
Because trademark-related harm is very unlikely to occur, the 
presumption of harm should not apply to merchandising rights cases. There 
are two alternative ways to implement this result. One is to make the 
presumption of harm rebuttable in general and to rely on the defendant to 
rebut it in the merchandising rights cases. The other is to make the 
presumption conclusive and to carve out exceptions for merchandising 
rights cases. 
The conclusive presumption approach is superior.298 A rebuttable 
presumption has the virtue of fitting results to the facts of particular cases, 
but it also encourages litigation over the rebuttal issue in almost every case. 
This increases litigation costs and uncertainty and empowers stronger 
parties to exert pressure for undesirable settlements. A conclusive 
presumption of harm reduces these costs. Though, like any general rule, it 
gets the wrong result in some cases, the number of wrong results should be 
quite small because trademark-related harm is virtually certain to occur in 
almost all competing products cases. Moreover, the obvious exceptions, 
such as merchandising rights cases, can be defined reasonably clearly in 
advance and thus handled by exempting them from the general rule without 
increasing litigation costs by too much. In fact, I argue later that there 
should be no trademark liability in merchandising rights cases, which would 
reduce litigation costs even further.299 
(2) Noncompeting products.—Let us next consider cases 
in which the plaintiff and the defendant offer distinct products that do not 
compete. Here we assume that the defendant innocently adopts its mark. If 
the defendant instead adopted the mark with intent to deceive consumers 
 
297  See, e.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33–35 (2003) (noting 
the importance of caution in extending trademark protection “into areas traditionally occupied by patent 
or copyright”); Lemley & McKenna, supra note 265, at 173–74 (noting that trademark law is not 
designed to encourage creation incentives in the way that copyright and patent laws are). It is true that 
trademark law is supposed to prevent a downward spiral of product quality, but this goal is tied to the 
ability of marks to communicate product quality information. In the Red Sox example, communication 
of quality information is not the problem. The problem is the inability to monopolize the merchandising 
market. 
298  Many factors are relevant to the choice between a rebuttable and a conclusive presumption, 
including the administrative costs of formulating rules in advance, the error costs of applying a 
conclusive presumption strictly, and the administrative and error costs of allowing for rebuttal. On the 
closely analogous choice between rules and standards, see Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of 
Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983), and Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An 
Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992). 
299  See infra note 339. 
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about quality, the moral argument would apply and support liability without 
any additional inquiry into harm. 
The first point to note is that the presumption of harm created for 
competing products cases should not apply to all noncompeting products 
because the risk of trademark-related harm is much less certain.300 Because 
the mark is still protected against competitive uses in the trademark owner’s 
primary market, consumers receive the full benefit of efficient information 
delivery there, and the trademark owner reaps the economic value of its 
mark for the products it actually sells. Thus, most of the mark’s value is 
realized by protection against source confusion in the primary market. 
Nevertheless, a presumption of harm might be warranted if the 
noncompeting product is so closely related to the plaintiff trademark 
owner’s product that consumers might mistakenly believe the plaintiff is the 
actual source.301 For example, suppose the plaintiff sells AFARION 
shampoo and the defendant sells AFARION soap. Although shampoo and 
soap do not compete, source confusion is still a serious risk because 
consumers could easily believe that the plaintiff was selling the defendant’s 
identically marked soap. To be sure, the plaintiff does not lose any sales 
because it is not in the soap market. However, the plaintiff is at much 
greater risk of reputation harm than in a pure sponsorship case not 
involving source confusion, and consumers are at greater risk of being 
misled. 
However, no presumption of harm should apply to noncompeting 
products cases that do not involve source confusion. Instead, the trademark 
owner should have to prove harm. There are two possible types of harm in 
these cases: (1) the risk of information distortion due to use on an inferior 
product in a related market and (2) the risk of efficiency losses associated 
with preventing the plaintiff from using the mark in the new market. By 
considering both types of harm, we can construct a set of factors to measure 
the social costs of trademark use on noncompeting products and an analytic 
framework for understanding the contribution each factor makes.302 
First, consider the risk of information distortion. Consumers who are 
confused about sponsorship might assume that the defendant’s product 
satisfies the same general quality standards as the plaintiff’s. If the quality 
 
300  See McKenna, supra note 294, at 70 (“On the whole, . . . one thing is clear: no presumption of 
harm from uses of a mark for non-competing goods is warranted.”); id. at 115 (“[S]tudies fail to support 
a general presumption of harm to a mark owner from use of the mark by non-competitors.”). 
301  See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 5, at 428–29; id. at 450 (applying a presumption of 
materiality to all source confusion cases as well as to cases involving confusion about “responsibility for 
quality,” and noting that “we should not presume social harm from likely confusion regarding other 
types of relationships”). 
302  As we saw supra Part II.B.1.a, Judges Hand and Frank used reputation and market-foreclosure 
harms as gatekeeping devices to screen monopolistic trademark suits. Here I treat these harms—or more 
precisely, their impact on the information transmission function of marks—as primary reasons to protect 
marks in the first place. 
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of the defendant’s product is in fact substantially inferior, the mark will 
communicate false information to consumers in the defendant’s market. 
Moreover, if consumers have a bad experience with the defendant’s 
products, they might transfer some of the blame to the plaintiff and thus 
discount the reliability of the mark in the plaintiff’s market as well. 
The seriousness of this harm depends on the extent to which consumers 
transfer quality information across different products and allow bad 
experiences with related products to influence their choices in the plaintiff’s 
primary market. Professor Mark McKenna points to marketing studies that 
shed light on these effects.303 According to McKenna, these studies show 
that consumers are likely to transfer positive brand image and association 
forward to a related product.304 But the studies also apparently show that 
consumers are not likely to transfer negative information about the related 
product back to the trademark owner.305 If the latter finding is true, it 
weakens the case for trademark protection based on negative feedback and 
information distortion in the plaintiff’s primary market. 
I have serious doubts, however, about the validity of this finding. For 
one thing, it is counterintuitive in a way that should make one skeptical of 
the results. Negative feedback, after all, must depend on the seriousness of 
the quality problem in the related market. If I believe that Aunt Jemima 
sells AUNT JEMIMA pancake flour as well as AUNT JEMIMA pancake 
syrup and I find rodent droppings in the flour, I am very likely to worry 
about the quality of the syrup. Moreover, as McKenna himself points out, 
the laboratory studies supporting the results have significant 
methodological limitations.306 
Furthermore, the results, even if valid in some situations, might not 
apply generally. For example, it would not be surprising if it took more than 
 
303  McKenna, supra note 294, at 97–115; see also Lemley & McKenna, supra note 5, at 427–38 
(citing these studies to support a proposal to focus on consumer beliefs about responsibility for quality). 
The studies test brand extensions and brand alliances. McKenna, supra note 294, at 94–95. “Brand 
extensions” are new products marketed by the same owner under the same brand, such as NIKE used for 
athletic-training services. “Brand alliances” are partnerships between firms in which each firm’s brand is 
used to promote the other’s product, such as promotional tie-ins between producers of children’s movies 
and fast food restaurants that appeal to children. See id. 
304  See id. at 98–101 (positive spillover for brand extensions); id. at 113 (positive spillover for brand 
alliances). 
305  See id. at 101–07 (negative feedback for brand extensions); id. at 114–15 (negative feedback for 
brand alliances). 
306  Id. at 95–96. McKenna argues that even with their flaws, “these studies remain the best available 
evidence regarding the impact of uses of a mark outside its original context.” Id. at 97. This might be so, 
but even if it is, it does not mean that we should ignore our own experiences as consumers. Those 
experiences, while not subject to controls or proper experimental methods, are still useful for assessing 
the initial plausibility of empirical findings. It is true that empirical findings can still be correct even 
though they fit experience poorly and unfiltered experience can often be an unreliable guide. But a poor 
fit with experience warrants special attention to methodological limitations and a particularly careful 
examination of the empirical results. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 1368 
one negative experience with the defendant’s product to change entrenched 
and strong positive attitudes toward the plaintiff’s product. But it would 
also not be surprising if consumers who had a bad experience with the 
defendant’s product before ever trying the plaintiff’s would shun the 
plaintiff and buy from its competitors if they thought the plaintiff was 
involved with the defendant’s product. In the latter case, there is no pre-
existing positive association with the plaintiff’s product to counter the bad 
experience. Indeed, some of the study results McKenna reports seem 
consistent with this prediction.307 
This is not the place to closely examine these marketing studies and 
McKenna’s claims. The studies he cites confirm positive spillover effects 
from the primary market to the related market.308 This fact alone supports a 
risk that the mark’s information transmission function will be impaired in 
the defendant’s market when consumers buy the defendant’s product 
believing that it has qualities it does not have. Moreover, there is still 
reason, notwithstanding the studies, to worry that the information content of 
a mark might be distorted in the primary market by low-quality uses in 
related markets.309 
These studies are most useful for identifying factors to estimate 
confusion-related harm. In particular, the similarity between the defendant’s 
and the plaintiff’s products is critical. The more similar the two products, 
the more likely consumers will transfer positive information about the 
plaintiff’s product forward to affect purchasing decisions in the defendant’s 
market and negative information about the defendant’s product back to 
affect the meaning of the mark in the plaintiff’s market.310 Also, according 
 
307  McKenna reports some studies that show that a bad experience with the quality of one brand 
extension compared to the perceived quality of the core brand can adversely affect consumer responses 
to later extensions. Id. at 102 & n.154 (citing Kevin Lane Keller & David A. Aaker, The Effects of 
Sequential Introduction of Brand Extensions, 29 J. MARKETING RES. 35, 44–45, 48 (1992)). Also, there 
is at least one study that shows that a bad experience with an extension can affect consumer perceptions 
of the general brand image even when it does not affect consumer attitudes toward existing products 
sold under the brand. Id. at 102 & n.155 (citing Joseph W. Chang, Will a Family Brand Image Be 
Diluted by an Unfavorable Brand Extension? A Brand Trial-Based Approach, 29 ADVANCES IN 
CONSUMER RES. 299, 302 (2002)). These studies suggest that a bad experience with a product might 
adversely affect later brand extensions—and, by implication, perhaps the original product if consumers 
try it subsequent to the bad experience, making it functionally equivalent to a brand extension from their 
perspective—and also that a bad experience can adversely affect the meaning of the brand in general. 
308  Id. at 98–101. 
309  McKenna claims that the brand-alliance studies are the most relevant for sponsorship confusion 
cases, but the single study he cites offers little support for that conclusion. See id. at 114–15. This study 
tested consumer attitudes when consumers were told negative information about the firm’s supplier or a 
celebrity endorser who had behaved badly. Neither situation is one where I would expect negative 
feedback effects. Everyone knows that many celebrities are difficult to control and often prone to behave 
badly. Moreover, negative information about a supplier is unlikely to have an adverse impact unless the 
information is about the quality of the supplies actually sold. 
310  Professor McKenna makes this point. Id. at 116 (arguing that courts should define product 
similarity in terms of complementarity, substitutability, and transferability). 
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to McKenna, positive spillover of brand information to a related product is 
more likely for high-quality brands, and at least one study suggests that 
negative feedback, when it occurs, is more likely for well-known brands.311 
This suggests that acquired strength should be a factor as well.312 
The second type of trademark-related harm relevant to noncompeting 
products results from market foreclosure—the fact that a trademark owner 
cannot use its mark in a related market if someone else is already using the 
mark there. However, it is difficult to see how market foreclosure impairs 
the efficient information transmission function of a mark.313 One might 
argue that allowing a trademark owner to use its established mark in the 
new market is more efficient than making it invest in developing a new 
mark. But the same is true for other firms wanting to use the mark, 
assuming they sell products of comparable quality. If it is equally costly for 
both firms to develop secondary meaning in a new mark, there is no reason 
to prefer the trademark owner on economic grounds.314 
Perhaps consumer confusion in the secondary market is more likely 
when consumers know that the plaintiff has entered the new market but are 
unaware that the plaintiff is using a different mark there. For example, 
suppose that Firm X sells APPLE car radios. If Apple Computers cannot 
stop X, and therefore must enter the car radio market using a different mark 
to avoid confusion, consumers who know that Apple has entered the market 
but are unaware of the new mark may reasonably assume that X’s APPLE 
car radios are Apple’s product. However, firms like Apple have strong 
incentives to advertise a new mark before entry, and thus build awareness 
of it, and this should reduce the risk of confusion.315 
Finally, because costs of entry are lower when a firm does not have to 
invest in developing a new mark, trademark owners might be more willing 
to enter new markets if they know they can use their existing marks there. 
 
311  Id. at 99, 104, 113. 
312  Another reason to count acquired strength for estimating harm has to do with the fact that 
distortions of the information carried by a strong mark will affect more consumers because more 
consumers use the mark. 
313  I focus on economic arguments in this section and ignore possible moral arguments for 
remedying market foreclosure harm. However, the moral arguments, based on the anti-free-riding 
principle and the right to protect personal identity, are deeply flawed as we have seen supra Parts 
IV.A.3–4. See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 265, at 167–84 (criticizing incentive, anti-free-rider, and 
natural rights arguments). 
314  Alternatively, one might argue that reserving the value of a mark in ancillary markets will 
enhance a trademark owner’s incentives to invest in and develop the mark in its primary market. 
However, the trademark owner already has substantial incentives to invest in the mark in order to reap 
profits in its primary market, and it is not clear how much additional incentive would be created by 
reserving ancillary markets or how much additional informational benefit a marginal increase in 
incentives would produce. See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 265, at 170–77 (thoroughly critiquing 
incentive-based arguments for preserving ancillary markets). 
315  Moreover, consumers are likely to adjust over time, so any serious confusion should only be 
temporary. 
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To be sure, the same is true for other firms, whose costs of entry would also 
be lower if they could use the mark. But there might be a good reason to 
prefer the trademark owner if the new product is closely enough related to 
the original so that the trademark owner can use its existing knowledge to 
achieve production efficiencies in the new market. In that case, chilling the 
trademark owner’s entry might be costly from a social point of view. 
There is a question whether this type of cost is one that trademark law 
should consider because it bears only a remote relationship to a mark’s 
information transmission function. Assuming that it is relevant, it would 
count in favor of the market-foreclosure rationale in some cases. 
Admittedly, the risk of efficiency loss from market foreclosure is not as 
strong a basis for extending protection as the risk of information distortion, 
but it still has some force. The most serious problems are probably limited 
to cases where the mark has very strong secondary meaning in the related 
market, the new product is fairly closely related to the trademark owner’s 
existing products, and the trademark owner is very likely to enter if given 
exclusivity. These conditions help assure that there will be efficiency gains 
from giving the trademark owner the exclusive right to exploit the mark. 
To recap the argument so far, we have seen that an economic analysis 
of trademark infringement should consider both the probability of confusion 
and the magnitude of harm that confusion is likely to generate. 
Distinguishing between these two components helps to sort out the factors 
relevant to each. As for estimating probability, some, but not all, of the 
factors in the current likelihood of confusion test are relevant. As for 
estimating harm, it is important to distinguish between competing and 
noncompeting products. If products directly compete, harm can be 
conclusively presumed when there is likely confusion—with some 
important exceptions, such as merchandising rights cases. A presumption of 
harm might also be warranted when products do not compete if those 
products are closely enough related that there is a serious risk of source 
confusion. There should be no presumption, however, when the plaintiff’s 
and the defendant’s products are more remotely related so that only 
sponsorship confusion is involved. In these cases, the trademark owner 
should have to prove substantial trademark-related harm. 
Moreover, by exploring the underlying policies, I identified several 
factors relevant to estimating harm. Mark similarity is important, of course. 
In addition, mark strength, in the sense of acquired secondary meaning, is 
important both for negative feedback and for market foreclosure rationales. 
Product similarity is crucial as well. The more similar the products, the 
more likely consumers will transfer favorable experiences with the 
plaintiff’s product forward to the defendant and bad experiences with the 
defendant’s product back to the plaintiff. And the more similar the products, 
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the more likely it is that efficiencies can be achieved by giving the 
trademark owner exclusivity in the related product market.316 
3. Materiality, “Responsibility for Quality,” and False 
Advertising.—Recently, some scholars have considered the 
possibility of adding a materiality requirement to trademark law. The idea is 
to limit liability to those cases where consumers are confused in a way that 
actually matters to their purchasing decisions.317 For example, source 
confusion that leads consumers to believe that the defendant’s television 
sets are the same high quality as the plaintiff’s satisfies the materiality 
requirement. However, confusion about whether the Dairy Queen company 
licensed use of its mark in a film about a Midwestern beauty contest called 
Dairy Queens is not likely to affect viewers’ decisions about whether to 
watch the film and thus not likely to satisfy the materiality requirement.318 
Professors Lemley and McKenna tie their materiality requirement to 
consumer beliefs about responsibility for quality.319 They argue that 
infringement should turn on “whether the defendant’s use is likely to 
confuse consumers about who is responsible for the quality of the 
defendant’s goods or services,”320 and they assume that information about 
who controls quality is necessarily material to consumers’ purchasing 
decisions.321 This means that in a competing products case, where 
consumers are confused into believing that the trademark owner actually 
sells the defendant’s product, confusion about responsibility for quality can 
be presumed—and with it, materiality.322 In a noncompeting products case, 
by contrast, materiality should be presumed only if the trademark owner 
proves that the defendant’s use creates confusion about responsibility for 
quality; otherwise, materiality must be proved directly.323 
An important consequence of these rules is that trademark owners must 
always prove materiality in cases like Dairy Queen, where products do not 
compete and consumers are not likely to be confused about responsibility 
 
316  It is worth emphasizing that these factors should not be applied mechanically, but rather with 
sensitivity to their probative value in estimating likely information distortion or reduced efficiency. It is 
also important to bear in mind that this analysis applies when the products are not so similar that source 
confusion is a serious risk. For, if source confusion is involved, it might be appropriate to presume harm. 
317  See, e.g., Grynberg, supra note 5, at 113–14; Lemley & McKenna, supra note 5, at 444-48; 
Tushnet, supra note 7, 1360–73. 
318  Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727 (D. Minn. 1998). To cite 
another example, confusion about whether Mattel, Inc. consented to the use of its BARBIE mark in 
Aqua’s “Barbie Girl” song is unlikely to be material. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 
(9th Cir. 2002). 
319  Lemley & McKenna, supra note 5, 444–48. 
320  Id. at 427. 
321  Id. at 428–29, 432–34 (noting that information about who controls quality is “real information 
that affects [consumers’] decisions about which products or services to buy”). 
322  See id. at 447. 
323  See id. 
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for quality. Lemley and McKenna assume that successful proof will be rare 
in these cases, and thus the materiality requirement will restrain judges 
from imposing liability on socially valuable uses that risk very little, if any, 
trademark-related harm.324 
Professor Rebecca Tushnet also supports a materiality requirement, 
although she does not tie it explicitly to responsibility for quality.325 For 
Lemley, McKenna, and Tushnet, trademark infringement should be seen as 
a type of false advertising.326 A false advertising claim requires a false 
statement of fact that is material to consumers.327 By analogy, use of a mark 
should infringe only when it communicates false information to consumers 
that is material to their purchasing decisions. 
This proposal is attractive in many ways, and I applaud the effort to 
rein in the excesses of current law. However, the proposal, as framed, has 
three major problems: (1) the concept “responsibility for quality” is too 
imprecise and narrow, (2) trademark law differs from false advertising in 
ways that suggest materiality might be too limiting a constraint, and 
(3) materiality does not do enough to address the chilling-effects problem 
and might even exacerbate it. 
First, consider the imprecision and narrowness of the responsibility for 
quality concept. To illustrate, suppose that the defendant sells NIKE fishing 
lures and that consumers are confused into believing that Nike, Inc. is 
connected or affiliated with the defendant in some way other than through 
manufacturing or selling the fishing lures. This sponsorship-type confusion 
need not translate into a belief that Nike is “ultimately responsible for,” or 
“guarantees,” or “controls” the quality of the defendant’s fishing lures.328 
Responsibility for quality, after all, is a rather strong inference to draw, 
especially when the consumer knows that the trademark owner is not the 
one actually making and selling the product. As Lemley and McKenna 
themselves recognize, a consumer might believe that the plaintiff has 
simply authorized the use of its mark or associated with the defendant in 
 
324  Id. at 447–48. 
325  Tushnet, supra note 7, at 1352–73. 
326  See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 5, at 445 (“We think that logically trademark law can be 
conceived as a specialized subset of false advertising law.”); Tushnet, supra note 7, 1312, 1344–75 
(noting that “[t]reating trademark infringement as a specialized type of false advertising makes sense,” 
and arguing that trademark law and false advertising law can learn from one another). 
327  See, e.g., Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc. v. 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 299 F.3d 1242, 1247, 
1250 (11th Cir. 2002) (listing the elements of a false advertising claim). 
328  Lemley and McKenna refer variously to consumers believing that the plaintiff is “ultimately 
responsible for the quality of the defendant’s goods or services,” that “the plaintiff has played a role in 
guaranteeing quality,” and that “the plaintiff controls the quality” or “assures their quality.” Lemley & 
McKenna, supra note 5, at 427, 428, 432. 
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some loose way without also believing that the plaintiff exercises control or 
otherwise guarantees the quality of the defendant’s product.329 
Suppose then that consumers in the NIKE example do not attribute 
responsibility for quality to Nike. Still, this does not mean that there is no 
trademark-related harm. In fact, there is a risk that the information 
transmission function of the NIKE mark will be impaired. If the fishing 
lures turn out to be of poor quality, consumers might infer that Nike is not 
as concerned about quality as they had previously thought. The chain of 
reasoning is familiar: if Nike chooses to associate with a firm that has low 
standards, Nike cannot care much about its own reputation, and therefore, 
might be sloppy about the quality of its own products. Regular Nike 
customers are not likely to be affected right away, but they might question 
Nike’s reputation after a few bad experiences with different products 
bearing the NIKE mark. Notice that this effect does not depend on 
consumers believing that Nike guarantees quality. It is just an application of 
the familiar rule of thumb that the character of the people one associates 
with says a lot about one’s own character. One does not necessarily vouch 
for one’s friends, nor does one take responsibility for what they do. Yet 
one’s choice of friends still speaks to one’s character.330 
The important point is that marks convey information in complex ways 
and consumers form negative impressions of sellers without necessarily 
blaming them for bad quality in the sense Lemley and McKenna have in 
mind. This is true even for the cases that Lemley and McKenna want to 
exclude from liability. Suppose, for example, that the viewers of the movie 
at issue in Dairy Queen believe that Dairy Queen licensed its mark for use 
in the movie title, but, as is surely the case, do not consider this fact 
material to their viewing decisions.331 There is still a risk to the information 
content of the mark if the movie turns out to be very bad. Viewers might 
wonder why Dairy Queen licensed its mark for use in such a bad movie, 
and they might think less of Dairy Queen as a result. To be sure, it is 
possible that viewers would discount a mistaken association that does not 
 
329  Id. at 427 (“Confusion about some relationships simply shouldn’t matter because it doesn’t 
affect consumers’ decisions to purchase the defendant’s goods or services.”). Lemley and McKenna 
must believe that not all relationships support an inference of responsibility for quality, for otherwise 
every trademark case would satisfy their materiality requirement. 
330  Lemley and McKenna might respond to this example by arguing that it is one of those cases that 
require proof of materiality. However, the materiality concept does not fit the way in which Nike’s mark 
is injured. The assumed association between Nike and the defendant in this example need not be 
material to any consumer’s purchasing decision in order to harm Nike’s reputation. Moreover, if Lemley 
and McKenna would treat this example as a case requiring proof of materiality, then one has to wonder 
how many cases actually fit in Lemley and McKenna’s second category (presuming materiality from 
responsibility for quality). Lemley and McKenna cite franchising arrangements as an example of a 
second-category case. Lemley & McKenna, supra note 5, at 428. But franchising is special. A franchise 
is all about responsibility for quality—it is what connects the franchisor with its franchisees—and the 
mark is supposed to convey that fact. 
331  Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727 (D. Minn. 1998). 
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matter to their purchasing decisions, but this is far from certain. Indeed, the 
risk of a negative inference might well increase with the number of 
confusing uses, even when none of those uses are material to consumer 
decisions. Of course, these are all empirical questions; but one thing is 
clear: the risk in these cases has nothing to do with responsibility for 
quality, and it can happen even in the absence of materiality. It is just 
another example of inferring character from choice of “friends.” 
This is not to say that there should be liability in such a case. In fact, I 
argue later that expressive use cases like Dairy Queen should be 
categorically exempted from liability.332 But the reason is not because there 
is no risk of trademark-related harm. There is a risk. Rather, it is because 
the risk is relatively low compared to the harm to free expression from 
enjoining the use. 
The second problem with the proposal is that a materiality requirement 
might be too restrictive. It focuses on consumer purchasing decisions in the 
short run and misses ways that consumer confidence in the reliability of 
marks might be impaired in the long run. The concern here is similar to the 
classic lemons problem.333 Consumers who believe that a mark can be used 
in misleading ways but who cannot identify the misleading uses in advance 
might discount the mark’s value in all its uses. Sellers might then respond 
by investing less in marks, and the result could be a less effective trademark 
system. 
For example, suppose consumers of NIKE fishing lures are confused 
that Nike is somehow involved, but their confusion is not material. Suppose 
too that the fishing lures are high quality so there is no risk of negative 
feedback. If these consumers later learn that Nike is not involved, they 
might wonder how many other uses of the NIKE mark are unauthorized, 
including uses that communicate material information. This is not likely to 
be a problem if it happens only occasionally, but it could become a problem 
if it happens repeatedly. 
Although this risk should be considered in any trademark analysis, it is 
important not to exaggerate it. Consumers are accustomed to marks being 
used in lots of different ways: for humorous effect, to embellish websites, 
for criticism, and so on. In our rough-and-tumble world of symbolic 
discourse, consumers are not likely to be too concerned about a mistaken 
belief that is not material, especially if they perceive a legitimate reason for 
 
332  See infra notes 338–39 and accompanying text. 
333  See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970). In the lemons model, asymmetric information about quality 
leads to a pooling equilibrium in which all products are low quality. For example, suppose the market 
for used cars includes sellers who market high-quality cars and sellers who market low-quality cars. If 
consumers are unable to verify quality before purchase, they will pay only the average of the value over 
high- and low-quality cars, which will not be enough for the sellers of high-quality cars. As a result, 
only low-quality cars will remain. 
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unauthorized use. For example, consumers who learn that Dairy Queen did 
not license use of its mark in the Dairy Queens movie are not likely to 
worry much about the reliability of the mark. Among other things, they can 
easily see that there is a good reason for using the mark in the title of a film 
about a Midwestern beauty pageant. However, the Nike example is more 
troubling because there is no obviously legitimate reason for the defendant 
to use the NIKE mark. 
The most problematic cases are probably limited to those where the 
plaintiff uses a word mark, the defendant’s mark is very similar, and the 
defendant’s use is in an ordinary commercial setting and in a customary 
trademark way. Moreover, even if a serious problem exists, the defendant’s 
use should not necessarily be enjoined. One must balance the social benefits 
in reducing the harm against the social costs of enjoining the defendant’s 
use, including the risk of creating product monopolies, harming First 
Amendment values, and so on. 
The important point is that materiality might not capture all the ways in 
which a mark’s information function can be degraded. While I am not 
aware of any consumer studies to this effect, it seems reasonable, based on 
experience, to suppose that marks often convey their information in a 
totalistic way. The mark itself can signal that a product is good without the 
consumer ever reducing it to specific factual statements about quality.334 
This type of signaling has obvious efficiencies.335 But for marks to work in 
this integrated way, consumers must be willing to trust their reliability, and 
it is precisely this trust that is put at risk by the lemons problem. 
The third difficulty with the materiality proposal has to do with chilling 
effects. As Part III explained, the amorphous likelihood of confusion test 
creates high litigation costs and decisional uncertainty that can chill socially 
valuable uses even before a suit is filed.336 The materiality requirement adds 
a new issue for adversarial dispute and one that is bound to increase 
litigation costs. In addition, its strong fact dependence is likely to increase 
decisional uncertainty. Whoever is the more powerful party—usually the 
trademark owner in these cases—can use higher costs and greater 
uncertainty to leverage a privately favorable, but socially undesirable, 
 
334  This is obviously true for the emotional and affective components of a mark’s meaning, as has 
been understood ever since the advent of psychological advertising. See Bone, Hunting Goodwill, supra 
note 35, at 579–82. Indeed, this is what constitutes a mark’s commercial magnetism or grip on 
consumers. See generally Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 
205 (1942) (referring to “the commercial magnetism of [a] symbol” and “the drawing power of a 
congenial symbol”). And it is obviously why firms are so keen on building brand identity. 
335  I put to one side objections, like those voiced by critics of trademark expansions during the 
1940s and 1950s, that the emotional power of a mark interferes with rational consumer choice. See 
supra note 80 and accompanying text. This is a very tricky argument to rigorously push through and 
economists today do not give it much weight. For a brief discussion of this point, see Bone, Hunting 
Goodwill, supra note 35, at 602–03. 
336  See supra notes 171–74 and accompanying text. 
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settlement. This is exactly what happens with the likelihood of confusion 
test today. To be sure, materiality creates an additional filing obstacle for 
these strategic plaintiffs. But the screening benefits are significantly 
reduced by materiality’s fact dependence, which is likely to preclude 
summary judgment, and the decisional uncertainty, which is likely to 
exacerbate chilling effects for risk-averse defendants.337 
The best way to handle the chilling-effect problem is to carve out 
categorical liability exemptions for the most seriously affected uses. For 
example, a defendant who uses a mark in an expressive work should have 
an absolute defense that depends only on proving that the use is 
expressively related to the work.338 Although a general rule exempting an 
entire category of uses is bound to be overinclusive, it makes good policy 
sense for expressive uses because the probability of serious trademark-
related harm from confusion is very low while the probability of a serious 
chilling effect is quite high.339 
A somewhat less effective way to deal with the chilling-effect problem 
is to impose gatekeeping requirements that strongly correlate with socially 
desirable uses and that can be judicially enforced at the beginning of a 
lawsuit.340 The gatekeeping requirements that Judges Hand and Frank used 
 
337  A materiality requirement might help somewhat if judges insist that plaintiffs show a substantial 
likelihood of success on materiality at the preliminary injunction stage, but this depends on judicial 
willingness to be strict early in the suit. 
338  The Second Circuit did essentially this in Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989). It 
held that the use of a trademark in the title of an artistic work is not actionable “unless [the use] has no 
artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or, if it [does have] some artistic relevance, unless 
[it] explicitly misleads as to source or the content of the work.” Id. at 999. The first requirement—
artistic relevance—assures that the use of the mark has some expressive connection with the work, and 
the second requirement—that the use does not explicitly mislead—makes sure that moral reasons for 
protection based on intentional deception do not apply. See also E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star 
Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying the Rogers test more generally to the use of a 
mark in the body of an expressive work). 
339  In general, a categorical exemption will usually be justified if its social benefits—measured in 
terms of the expected error costs it avoids and the administrative costs it saves—exceed its social 
costs—measured in terms of the expected error costs it creates by excluding cases where the facts 
actually support liability. On the choice between strict rules and flexible standards, see supra note 298 
and accompanying text. The same policy balance favors exemptions for other types of use as well. For 
example, a strong case can be made for exempting the merchandising rights cases (at least when the 
defendant uses a disclaimer) and also product design trade dress cases. See Bone, supra note 13, at 
2182–84. In fact, one can read the Supreme Court’s opinion in TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing 
Displays, Inc. as an effort to create an absolute exemption for utilitarian trade dress. 532 U.S. 23, 32–34 
(2001). But see Valu Eng’g, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d 1268, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (reading 
TrafFix Devices more narrowly). 
340  Lemley and McKenna propose what they call a “trademark injury” doctrine, which would 
mandate as a condition of standing that trademark owners “demonstrate (1) that their injury flows from 
confusion about the actual source of the defendant’s goods or about who is responsible for the quality of 
those goods, or (2) that the defendant’s use causes confusion about some other relationship that is 
material to consumer purchasing decisions.” Lemley & McKenna, supra note 265, at 188. The problem 
with this proposal is that it requires a trial on liability to determine standing. 
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do not fit the new types of uses that create chilling effects today. One 
promising approach might be to require plaintiffs in Internet and 
expressive-use cases to prove actual confusion rather than likelihood of 
confusion and to require plaintiffs to submit substantial evidence of actual 
confusion early in the litigation.341 The advantage of this approach is that it 
guards against speculation about likely confusion. A disadvantage is that it 
forces trademark owners to suffer harm from actual confusion before 
obtaining injunctions in legitimate cases. But the harm is only temporary 
and should not be serious in the Internet and expressive-use cases under 
consideration. 
This is not the place to explore these possibilities with care. My point 
is only that we need special rules to deal with the chilling-effect problem 
and that a materiality requirement does not serve this purpose. I favor 
categorical exemptions where they make sense as a policy matter, and 
where they do not, I favor threshold requirements that are clear and 
judicially enforceable at an early stage. There is always the temptation to 
try to get the right result in each individual case, but this is exactly what 
creates high litigation costs, decisional uncertainty, and chilling effects. 
C. Summary 
Part IV has demonstrated the importance of distinguishing between 
moral and economic arguments in constructing a sensible likelihood of 
confusion test. Focusing on moral arguments, we saw that intentional 
deception should be taken out of the likelihood of confusion test and treated 
as its own distinct basis for liability. Moreover, consumer autonomy as a 
moral value might justify infringement in some cases, and a moral right to 
protect personal identity might support prima facie trademark liability in 
those cases where individuals use personal names as marks for closely held 
businesses with which they strongly identify. Beyond these situations, the 
moral arguments are not persuasive, including arguments based on a 
general moral right to consumer autonomy, a moral duty not to free ride on 
goodwill, and a personhood-based right to protect individual identity. 
As for an economic analysis, it supports dividing the liability test into 
two parts: an estimate of the probability of consumer confusion and an 
estimate of the trademark-related harm when consumers are confused. A 
bifurcated test resolves the doctrinal muddle of the unitary likelihood of 
confusion test by assigning factors to their proper functions. Furthermore, 
in estimating the degree of harm, judges should distinguish between 
competing products and noncompeting products. Uses on competing 
products should trigger a conclusive presumption of harm, subject to 
 
341  Making the plaintiff plead actual confusion might serve a screening function by itself if courts 
are strict about applying the new plausibility pleading standard to trademark suits. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
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exceptions for special cases, such as merchandising rights. The same 
presumption might also apply to cases involving noncompeting products 
when the defendant’s product is so closely related to the plaintiff’s that 
actual source confusion is a serious risk. However, no presumption should 
apply to uses on noncompeting products beyond source confusion, and the 
estimate of harm should be guided in these cases by factors relevant to the 
impact of a noncompeting use on the mark’s information transmission 
function. 
Finally, a focus on responsibility for quality is ill-advised, at least 
without a clearer definition of the concept, and a materiality requirement 
must be thought through more carefully. To protect against chilling socially 
valuable uses, trademark law should use categorical exemptions or 
threshold gatekeeping requirements. 
CONCLUSION 
The likelihood of confusion test is in a state of disarray. A close study 
of its history reveals an important reason why. The test emerged as an 
historical compromise that papered over conflicting views about the proper 
reach of trademark law without resolving the normative disagreements that 
gave rise to the conflict. Those disagreements manifest today as doctrinal 
and normative incoherence. And the result is a vague and uncertain test that 
chills socially valuable uses and facilitates unjustified expansions of 
trademark law. 
This Article identified two key steps toward solving these problems. 
Both involve restructuring the infringement test so that it more closely fits 
the policies trademark law should serve. The first step is to distinguish 
carefully between moral and economic justifications. The second step is to 
separate two prongs of an economic analysis—the probability of confusion 
and the trademark-related harm from confusion. Separating these two 
prongs points the way to a more sensible reorganization of the current 
likelihood of confusion factors. Also, a serious examination of trademark-
related harm suggests promising ways to limit liability, including 
categorical exemptions for certain uses and gatekeeping requirements to 
screen undesirable suits. 
Trademark law has suffered under the likelihood of confusion test for 
far too long. The problems run deep and ad hoc tinkering with factors will 
not solve them. The test needs a complete overhaul. A properly functioning 
trademark system depends on it. 
 
